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EXPLAINING CHINA'S EVOLVING POLICY ON UN PEACEKEEPING

by

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June 2017

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EXPLAINING CHINA'S EVOLVING POLICY ON UN PEACEKEEPING

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ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to illuminate the factors that have contributed to Chinese policy changes regarding UN peacekeeping operations. Using Yongjin Zhang's framework, it identifies four phases of evolution in China's UN peacekeeping participation: opposition, non-interference, cooperation, and participation. The reasons for a state's participation in peacekeeping operations are diverse, ranging from self-interest to altruism. The evolution of Chinese support for UN peacekeeping is derived from its self-interested security concerns and its self-identity in relation to other states. When China believed its security was threatened, it sought opportunities to balance the threat by developing ties with international organizations and powers. Subsequently, as it has grown into those organizations, China has identified itself as a leader within them. China's defense of Westphalian principles of sovereignty creates the impression that China is in opposition to Western powers in their efforts to propose, pass, and execute UN peacekeeping operations. This has led scholars and politicians to question the degree of commitment China has to UN peacekeeping principles and institutions.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND MAIN FINDINGS

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has gradually evolved from opposing most international organizations to supporting and joining many of them. China's involvement in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations has followed a similar evolution, and it is currently an active supporter and participant in UN peacekeeping operations. Just like in other international organizations and activities, China has gradually become more involved, taking pragmatic and disciplined steps in selecting and participating in UN peacekeeping operations. China is currently participating in 11 United Nations peacekeeping operations with 3,042 personnel, contributing by far the most personnel of all of the UN permanent Security Council members. Despite its apparently large contribution, China provides guarded support to UN peacekeeping operations as it does not support every mission and still provides vigorous debate when issues of sovereignty come up. Which factors explain China's evolution from its early opposition to all UN peacekeeping operations to its current rate of participation? This thesis will examine the motivating factors of self-interest and altruism using existing literature to determine the dominant factor.

This thesis aims to understand the factors that have contributed to Chinese policy changes in regards to UN peacekeeping operations. Using Yongjin Zhang's framework it identifies four phases of evolution in China's UN peacekeeping participation: opposition, non-interference, cooperation, and participation. The reason for a state's participation in peacekeeping operations are diverse, ranging from self-interest to altruistic. The Chinese evolution in its support of UN peacekeeping is derived from its self-interested security concerns and its self-identity in relation to other states. When China believed its security was threatened it sought opportunities to balance the threat by developing ties with international organizations and powers. Subsequently, as it has grown into those organizations China has developed an identity that it should be a leader within them. China's defense of Westphalian principles of sovereignty creates the impression that China is in opposition to Western powers in their efforts to propose, pass, and execute

UN peacekeeping operations. This has led scholars and politicians to question the degree of commitment China has to UN peacekeeping principles and institutions.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This thesis will increase awareness of the factors that influence China's policy choices in regards to the UN. This will create a better understanding of how committed China is to UN peacekeeping within the current set of global norms and will shed some light on whether China will attempt to use its influence to reshape the UN global peacekeeping missions in manners more in keeping with China's own interests. In addition, this thesis will create a greater appreciation of what influence China's policy decisions will enable more effective communications and negotiations with China as well as insights on how to persuade the China to greater contributions to UN peacekeeping operations

Understanding the factors that have led to China's changes in foreign policy in regards to UN PKO's will create better a understanding of what has influenced China to become more involved in international institutions, and how the leadership in China has developed strategies to work in those institutions despite difference in values. Knowledge of which factors have the most significance will enable policy makers to better leverage negotiations with China.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review is organized into two main sections. The first explores the general evolution of norms and how they are applied to United Nations peacekeeping operation. This section examines how and why countries become involved in peacekeeping operations and how the UN has modified its peacekeeping operations overtime to mirror changes in global norms.

The second section will examine with the evolution of China's foreign policy into support of peacekeeping operations after years of opposition and then abstaining. This section will then review some of the factors that may have influenced China to become involved in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

1. Peacekeeping Justifications, and Norms and Applications

Self-interest has been postulated by many as a key factor in states becoming involved in peacekeeping. Jacob Kathman and Molly Melin explore the security benefits derived from states that provide peacekeepers.¹ They explore the trend of developing states providing a significant number of troops to peacekeeping operations. Vincenzo Bove and Leandro Elia discuss proximity of threat from the unrest a causal factor for states to engage in peacekeeping operations. Andrea Carati and Andrea Locatelli use Italy as a case study to determine whether self-interest, or identity issues prevail in influencing peacekeeping operations. John Karlsrud and Kari Osland use Norway as a case study to examine how security issues from the perspective of a small power have influenced its decisions to participate in international organizations with the goal of global security.

Humanitarian intervention has a long history even prior to the United Nations; states would have often intervened in the borders of others states to aid people.² William Durch studies the modern role of the United Nations in peacekeeping and how it has evolved.³ In Durch's introduction, he demonstrates that the fall of the colonial empires brought about humanitarian crises that were greater than the host states could handle.⁴ The UN was often ineffective as it could not compete with the bipolar activities of the Soviet Union and the United States.⁵ The two superpowers would often balance each other by vetoing a proposal in UN which limited the number of peacekeeping missions, or changed or restricted the mandate to unarmed observers. Several of the case studies demonstrate how the UN has created and modified its policies in creating mandates and manning and equipping them. The collapse of the Soviet Union led, in part, to a four-fold

¹ Jacob M. Kathman and Molly D. Melin, "Who Keeps the Peace? Understanding State Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations," *International Studies Quarterly* (2016): 1.

² Gary J. Bass, *Freedom's Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention* (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), 4.

³ William J. Durch, "Introduction," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St Martin's Press 1993), 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

increase in UN PKOs by 1992.⁶ Of the 16 ongoing missions 38% were started before 1991 indicating a refining of procedures to better determine success or failure.⁷ Trevor Findlay echoes that argument by breaking up peacekeeping into the cold war and post-cold war eras.⁸ This theory explains that the destabilization after the collapse in the balance of power in great power politics left some states in disarray. The power battle for resources and international prestige was over causing the great powers to retrench. The U.S. and Russia re-evaluated their vital interests and determined that some of the fragile states no longer were crucial to their security. These fragile states that were no longer received the support they so badly needed to maintain control of their populations.

The motivations for states to become involved in UN peacekeeping operations has also changed. Gary Bass's work discusses identity as a key factor. He demonstrates that a nation that has a similar identity with the victims is more likely to intercede in another state with a humanitarian mission.⁹ Support to other peoples in other states grew from ethnic and national identities to include a connection based on shared humanity.¹⁰ Bass shows how the writing of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Burke transformed the way some elites viewed the status identity, changing their allegiance from ethnic or civic to that of a large human connection.¹¹ Martha Finnemore echoes this theory in her work by stating, "Who is human has changed, that is, who can successfully claim humanitarian protection from strong states has changed."¹² One of the key roles in developing the ties between the victims and the group seeking intervention is the media.¹³ The media develops the

⁶ William J. Durch, "Introduction," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St Martin's Press 1993), 463.

⁷ United Nations, Peace Keeping Operations, *List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2013*, accessed 21 September 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf>.

⁸ Trevor Findlay, "The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping," in *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*, SIPRI Research Report 12, ed. Trevor Findlay (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 1.

⁹ Gary J. Bass, *Freedom's Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention* (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), 19.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 22.

¹² Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 2003), 53.

¹³ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* 25.

linkages between peoples on a human level creating the impetus for action to help the people in need. China's self-identity as a developing state may impel it to support its fellow down trodden or will the great power identity force a more pragmatic response.

Findlay states that peacekeeping motivations have changed since its inception, describing strong powers pressuring allies to support missions.¹⁴ He lists international prestige up to and including inclusion as a new permanent United Nations Security Council member; altruistic humanitarian reasons—some states contribute so that they feel that they have done their part to contribute to better global norms or even as a payment in the event that they are in distress; national interests to calm regional unrest boosts the contributing nation's national security by preventing refugee influxes or unrest in similar communities within their borders; monetary or material benefits such as donations of equipment and UN payments for troop participation; and experience for the military in operations and in learning to follow constitutional rule.¹⁵ Arturo Sotomayor lists the following factors as motivating agents for states to become involved in UN peacekeeping: 1. States undergoing a democratic transition seek to align with international organizations to provide elites with socializing opportunities to the new norms; 2. States undergoing a democratic transition need to demonstrate stability for future international investments and commitments; 3. Accelerating civil-military relations also discussed by Findlay; and 4. A monetary incentive as demonstrated by Findlay.¹⁶ Sotomayor refutes the claims of Edward Mansfield and Jon Pevehouse that illiberal and authoritarian states will be socialized into adopting more liberal norms through its interactions with the UN and its peacekeeping missions by showing case studies of authoritarian states that have deployed troops to peacekeeping operations and how the personnel have not returned to their home states and spread the ideals imbibed while on peacekeeping missions.¹⁷

¹⁴ Findlay, "The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping," 7.

¹⁵ Ibid., 7–10.

¹⁶ Arturo C. Sotomayor, *The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 25–37

¹⁷ Sotomayor, *The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper*, 3 and 25.

2. China and Policy toward UN Peacekeeping

Yongjin Zhang outlines the slow evolution of the Chinese policies.¹⁸ Zhang proposes that China's attitude and reaction to UN peacekeeping operations can be seen in four phases: Phase I condemnation from 1950–1971, Phase II non-interference from 1971–1981, Phase III cooperation from 1982–1988, and Phase IV participation, from 1989 to the present.¹⁹ Zhang's outlines how China has slowly and deliberately modified its policy as its role in world politics has evolved.

Others have examined whether China intends to continue to support global norms or at some time in the future to subvert them through their analysis of China's participation in PKOs. One line of argument suggests that the UN's policy of "responsibility to protect" is in conflict with China's belief in state sovereignty and may lead to a reduction in support for UN peacekeeping operations

These scholars suspect that China will work to block UN peacekeeping in the United Nations, or even worse sabotage the system from within, by gaining international influence and greater access. Realists often view China as "too big, proud, and independently minded for America to 'tame' or 'manage.'"²⁰ John Lee seeks to demonstrate China's interests and motivations are often contrary to America's and that the two are actually engaged in a "strategic competition."²¹ The strategic competition scholars view national interests in terms of resource attainment as significant motivation.

Others argue, by contrast, that China will embrace the new norms and become even more integrated in the global political system. In this line of thinking China is seeking to expand its influence, but if properly enticed, willing to work within the current parameters of the UN. Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang argue that greater engagement with China will lead to improved cooperation and less ambiguity in the policies of China

¹⁸ Yongjin Zhang, "China and UN Peacekeeping: From Condemnation to Participation," *International Peacekeeping*, 3:3 (1996), doi: 10.1080/13533319608413620, 1.

¹⁹ Ibid., 2.

²⁰ John Lee, "Reaching the Limits: China as a Responsible Power," *Project 2049 Institute*, July 2016, 10.

²¹ Ibid., 7.

toward UN peacekeeping.²² The positive engagements will pull China to accept global norms and become less recalcitrant. This is an identity argument that seeks to prove that as China is brought into the global norm it will see itself as more invested in supporting it.

Complicating the issue of identification with global norms is the fact that China's self-identity is split: Fung observes that its dual roles as both a great power and a developing state give it multiple responsibilities and perspectives on the role of the United Nations in conflict resolution.²³ The great powers focus on attempts to quell violence and have pushed human rights as an agenda for peacekeeping operations. Developing states often prefer less oversight and greater state sovereignty in subduing internal disputes. China is vulnerable to appeals on policy, if the entreaties do not interfere with core interests, by attacking China's role in either of these two identities.

There is a middle ground in the debate between strategic competition versus increased engagement. Chien-pin Li argues that China has always acted in a pragmatic methodical manner to reduce risks. In essence, China's peacekeeping effort have been consistent with its policies of non-intervention.²⁴ China will continue to act in its own best interest and will not quickly change directions unless it has deliberated on the effects of the policy change.

The majority of the literature available simply describes the changes in Chinese policies not fully evaluating potential causal factors in light of what typically motivates states to participation in peacekeeping. The causal factor of communist ideology as a deciding factor is glossed over in the literature as a potential causal factor in the initial phases of opposition. When China becomes a member of the Security Council, the literature does not use communist ideology as a causal factor in determining why China moved to abstaining from voting on UN PKOs. The sudden shift from opposition to non-

²² Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, "China's Expanding Peacekeeping Role: Its Significance and the Policy Implications," *SIPRI Policy Brief*, February 2009, 1 and 3. SIPRI.

²³ Courtney Fung, "What Explains China's Deployment to UN Peacekeeping Operations," *International Relations of Asia Pacific* 16 (2015): 411 and 432–33.

²⁴ Chien-pin Li, "Norm Entrepreneur or Interest Maximizer?: China's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations 2001–2010," *China and International Journal* 9.2 (2011), 327. Project Muse.

interference is a more significant shift than moving from cooperation to participation. The potential causal factor of security interests is discussed heavily by some authors but not in a systematic way. The claims in the literature have specific examples but are not quantitatively analyzed for greater patterns. The literature does not give China much credit as a state interested in human rights. China's media and leadership assert such claims, but the significance that China places on state sovereignty has often conflicted both domestically and internationally with any claims to humanitarian concerns. The fourth claim of identity has some traction in the literature, with Courtney Fung specifically assigning it significance. Finnemore's claims of the fluidity of identity and interests leads credence to this as being a potentially significant causal factor in China changing its policy towards PKOs. Lastly, the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations will potentially show that the conditions that initially prohibited China from participating have been removed by improved organization practice within the UN. In particular, the more stringent international norms and greater restraints put on the great powers by improved oversight and norms provided China with the confidence to participate in peacekeeping operations. The literature that claims the causal factor of a socializing effect for civil-military relations would not be a significant justification for China to participate in peacekeeping operations as they have used mostly logistical support personnel and not combat units. In addition, the history in China of using combat units against their own people makes this an unlikely justification for China to become more involved in PKOs. The monetary benefits to China are not significant as China is also one of the large financial contributors to peacekeeping operations.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Based on the literature review above, two central causal factors will be examined as the reason for the change in Chinese foreign policy from opposition to guarded support: self-interest as it relates to Chinese security and China's self-identity. This thesis will assess the relative weight of each factor in moving China along its evolution across the four phases of posture toward PKOs described by Zhang as follows.

1. Realist Security Concerns

If self-interest was the dominant factor, then China would seek participation in international organizations that could provide future protections. China is interested in securing its national interests then China would leverage its participation and support to peacekeeping missions to ensure material benefits such as favorable extractive trade deals. Or improve its international status such as the recognition of the People's Republic of China over the Republic of China in Taiwan.

2. Constructivist Identity Building

If identity is a key factor in determining Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping operations, then how China sees itself will determine if international pressures from either the “global south” with China as a role model and example to follow, or pressures from the “great powers” pressing for a responsible partner would be highly influential in policy decision making. China's dual identity make it susceptible to different pressures to conform to norms of either identity. When the norms of both identities align China will likely easily conform to decisions; however, when the norms are not aligned China will be hesitant to make a decision and may delay decisions and participation.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis will adopt a historical narrative approach to examine the relative weight of potential causal factors for the changes in Chinese policy toward UN peacekeeping. This thesis will adopt and be organized along Zhang's categorization of the four phases of China's evolution toward peacekeeping operations. For each of the transitions between the phases the thesis will examine when and how China changed policy in the context of geo-political events and domestic political movements and hypothesize which of the causal factors of self-interests or identity had the greatest influence on those changes in policy towards UN peacekeeping operations. Historical analysis will lead to conclusions about which factors influence China the most in its relations with the UN and peacekeeping operations. In concluding, the thesis will examine the extent to which China has reshaped UN peacekeeping policy. The

involvement and level of commitment will give credence to China's view of their role as participants or as a leader interested in developing and shaping UN peacekeeping policy or as opponents.

The literature on the evolution and the factors motivating states to become involved in peacekeeping operations is well developed and with many conflicting opinions on which one is the primary and why. Particular attention is given to a motivating factor in separate works. The complete exploration of all factors in one work is missing. This thesis will examine two main factors and place it in the context of its evolution to assess the importance that each may have had in changing the policies of the China.

United Nations spreadsheets and source documents will demonstrate the quantity of personnel submitted to support UN peacekeeping operations. Chinese official communications will further demonstrate changes in policy and any potential friction between UN policy and Chinese policy.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE

This thesis will be divided into four chapters. Chapter I has recapped the major questions and the significance of the thesis, and reviewed the literature on peacekeeping justifications and on China's participation in peacekeeping. Chapter II will explore the history of peacekeeping and its current form in the United Nations. This chapter will lay out in more detail the range of motivations of the different states to become involved in peacekeeping operations. Chapters III will be the main empirical chapters of the thesis examining the four phases: phase I condemnation (1950–1971), phase II non-interference (1971–1981); phase III of cooperation (1982–1988), and phase IV participation (1989 to present). Each of these sections will more fully characterize China's posture and behavior toward PKOs and assess the relative weight of the casual factors in determining these outcomes. Chapter IV will conclude by providing as summary assessment of the main motivations behind China's involvement in international peacekeeping; and reflect on the implications for Chinese and U.S. foreign policy more generally.

II. PEACEKEEPING NORMS AND APPLICATION IN THE UN

This chapter argues that norms of state intervention in conflict with peacekeeping forces underwent a transformation after the Cold War. There are two main arguments that will be discussed in regards to peacekeeping and they are the Westphalian and post-Westphalian points of view. The Westphalian camp argues that state sovereignty is paramount and that interference in domestic affairs is to be avoided.²⁵ The post-Westphalians argue for intervention in domestic affairs, as states that act aggressively against their domestic population will have no compunction in acting against neighboring states. In addition, the domestic instability can influence instability across borders as refugees and international criminal syndicates smuggle people and weapons into the conflict area.²⁶ This chapter provides a general background of peacekeeping and then goes into detail of UN peacekeeping during the Cold War and after. Table 1 demonstrates the evolution of UN peacekeeping from the dominant thought and how it impacted the method of peacekeeping.

Table 1. Evolution of UN Peacekeeping by Era, Dominant Thought, and Method

Era	Cold War (1950–1991)	Post-Cold War (1991–2001)	Post-9/11 (2001–Present)
Dominant thought in regards to Peacekeeping	Westphalian	Post-Westphalian	Responsibility to Protect
Dominant Method of peacekeeping	Interstate Buffer	Intrastate buffer	Intrastate rebuilding

²⁵ Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004), 1–2.

²⁶ Ibid., 1–2.

This chapter will illustrate that as the UN has transitioned from a Westphalian to a post-Westphalian interpretation of peacekeeping norms, and the following chapter will demonstrate how the People's Republic of China (PRC) has also followed the changing norms, though more cautiously.

A. FORMATION OF PEACEKEEPING NORMS

There are two main arguments that will be discussed in regards to peacekeeping are the Westphalian and post-Westphalian points of view. The Westphalian camp argues that state sovereignty is paramount and that interference in domestic affairs is to be avoided.²⁷ The Westphalian peacekeeping operations are generally established to separate a conflict with a government and a rebel group within a state. The post-Westphalians argue for intervention in domestic affairs, as states that act aggressively against their domestic population will have no compunction in acting against neighboring states.²⁸ The post-Westphalian peacekeeping operations are often in fragile states and incorporate a “multifunctional [approach], with political, humanitarian, social and economic components requiring civilian experts and relief specialists to work in parallel with soldiers.”²⁹ The lines between the two points of view remain drawn on Cold War ideological boundaries with “Westphalian supporters, newly independent states, Russia, and China, while post-Westphalians include, the U.S., Canada, Britain, France, and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations, such as International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch.”³⁰ These arguments frame the normative changes that the UN undergoes and how it responds to peacekeeping missions.

Defining peacekeeping is problematic as determining the rules of employment. Weapons have been named after this term, the MX missile “peacekeeper” and the Colt

²⁷ Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 1–2.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 1–2.

²⁹ United Nations *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations Public Information Department, 1985), 5.

³⁰ Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 3.

Peacemaker to name a couple, thus implying a deterrent value to peacekeeping.³¹ Invading militaries have labeled their forces as peacekeepers as well—the U.S. named their troops the Caribbean Peace Keeping Forces in the operation in Grenada.³² Leaders suggest that through the use of force peace can be won. How individuals use the term peacekeeping, “seems to contradict the whole notion of peace, much less the idea that such a condition should be preserved.”³³ The nature of peace is seen as fragile, and it must be actively protected through deterrence or violence.

The UN delineates a “spectrum of peace and security activities including peacekeeping, conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peace building.”³⁴ The current UN description of peacekeeping explains it as, “one among a range of activities undertaken by the United Nations and other international actors to maintain international peace and security throughout the world.”³⁵ Peacekeeping operations are formed in response to an incident that has caused largescale loss of life.³⁶ The common definition of peacekeeping today is “any international effort involving an operational component to promote the termination of armed conflict or the resolution of longstanding disputes.”³⁷ The international component provides legitimacy to the operation as a unilateral approach can be seen as interest based. The UN has been criticized because many of its missions have terminated the armed conflict, but have done little to resolve the dispute, leaving the potential for a renewal of hostilities should the UN pull out.

As the concept, Westphalian principle of state sovereignty took hold it became more common for arbitration to be used to reduce conflict. The lesser powers encouraged

4. ³¹ Paul H. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 4.

³² Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, 4.

³³ Ibid., 4–5.

³⁴ United Nations: Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, New York: United Nations Secretariat, 2008, 17.

³⁵ United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 17.

³⁶ Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, 11.

³⁷ Diehl, 4–5.

the great powers to view conflict under a new norm. Great Powers were pressured to reduce what was previously seen as their right to use force against smaller powers. This concept, of international relations based on legal precedence, instituted a norm change. The new customs led to further additional alterations in norms to permit arbitration of conflict.³⁸ Arbitration as a means of resolving international disputes seems counter to the interests of great powers. Many neo-realist international relations scholars argue that the great powers would be loathed to constrain themselves to arbitration, yet the norms of peaceful resolution of disputes have in fact taken hold.³⁹ This is even more surprising, as the great powers often worked together to observe one another and act as checks on each other with little coordination and joint planning when it came to peacekeeping interventions.⁴⁰ Martha Finnemore, an international relations constructivist scholar, points out “over time, states construct rules among themselves about when intervention is legitimate or necessary. These rules are not divorced from power or interests. To the contrary, rules about intervention are strongly, if not entirely, shaped by the actions of powerful states that actually have the capacity to intervene.”⁴¹ These independent, yet mutually reinforcing, norms each bolster one another “as part of a highly structured social context.”⁴² Changes in one set of norms may necessitate “logical or ethical” changes in another set.⁴³

The transition in normative values from state sovereignty to the belief in the necessity in intervention has changed. In addition the method of delivery peacekeeping has changed from unilateral intervention to the point that only international organizations are considered legitimate.⁴⁴ Unilateral peacekeeping interventions now lack the legitimacy of multilateral organizations and are questioned. This multilateral force was

³⁸ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 444–45.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 81.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 56.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 56.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 74.

preferred to be a UN force made up of impartial states.⁴⁵ With these new norms, the post-Westphalians called for the bolstering UN peacekeeping. Some post-Westphalian scholars argue that the UN needs an autonomous force with specific capabilities, or at the very least the UN should codify members' troop contributions to support potential peacekeeping operations.⁴⁶

Peacekeeping is also difficult to define and operationalize international relations. The predominant realist international relations theories discuss rational actors determining their interests and seeking to build security. The concept of one state using its resources to provide support to another state that does not have security implications was out of step with the majority of realist scholars. Constructivists began investigating other potential justifications for peacekeeping operations. When researchers review cases of humanitarian intervention they frequently hypothesize the following reasons as justification: self-interest which can be security concerns by improving international support against a rival, preventing refugee influxes, or taming civil unrest in similar ethnic communities.⁴⁷ Financial self-interest can be either through resources gained from the host state, monetary or material benefits such as donations of equipment and UN payments for troop participation.⁴⁸ These benefits can be used to improve domestic spending to increase their domestic legitimacy.⁴⁹ The ability to send domestic rivals to a type of unofficial exile to improve domestic security for the regime.⁵⁰ States undergoing a democratic transition need to demonstrate stability for future international investments and commitments and participation in international organizations can provide the

⁴⁵ Ibid., 80.

⁴⁶ Hartley and Utley, introduction to *Major Powers and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and Challenges of Military Intervention*, 1.

⁴⁷ Jacob M. Kathman and Molly D. Melin, "Who Keeps the Peace? Understanding State Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations," *International Studies Quarterly* (2016): 7–10.

⁴⁸ Findlay, "The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping," in *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*, SIPRI Research Report 12, ed. Trevor Findlay (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 7–10, and Arturo C. Sotomayor, *The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 25–37.

⁴⁹ Kathman and Melin, "Who Keeps the Peace? Understanding State Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations," 3–4.

⁵⁰ Findlay, "The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping," 7–10.

impression of stability and commitment to norms.⁵¹ States participate in peacekeeping to provide experience for the military in operations and in learning to follow constitutional rule.⁵² In addition, states undergoing a democratic transition seek to align with international organizations to provide elites with socializing opportunities to new norms.⁵³ Justifications for humanitarian altruistic issues center on identity. States may identify with people impacted in foreign country.⁵⁴ The identity of the state indicates that it should respond to a humanitarian crisis.⁵⁵ Other states contribute so that they feel that they have done their part to contribute to global norms.⁵⁶

These justifications do not tell the whole story. As Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams point out, “the existing literature suggests that previous attempts to theorize why states provide UN peacekeepers are incapable of accounting for the wide variations in state behavior largely because they rely on one or two causal factors.”⁵⁷ The UN Secretary General noted that states work in the UN peacekeeping can be divided into three categories: troop contributors, financial contributors, and mandate approvers.⁵⁸ Within those categories, it is even more complicated as the size and quantity of the contributions to UN peacekeeping can be additional factors in determining the level of a state’s participation.⁵⁹ Several states send token contributions of one or two people to just a few peacekeeping operations. Equating the token contributors on the same level of states that consistently contributes hundreds of troops across multiple operations is problematic and can lead to misleading conclusions.

⁵¹ Sotomayor, *The Myth of the Democratic*, 25–37

⁵² Findlay, “The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping,” 7–10.

⁵³ Sotomayor, *The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper*, 25–37

⁵⁴ Bass, *Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention*, 19.

⁵⁵ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force*, 53.

⁵⁶ Findlay, “The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping,” 7–10.

⁵⁷ Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “Introduction,” in *Providing Peacekeepers*, ed. Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 17.

⁵⁸ Bellamy and Williams, “Introduction,” in *Providing Peacekeepers*, 3.

⁵⁹ Donald C. F. Daniel, “Contemporary Patterns in Peace Operations, 2000–2010,” in *Providing Peacekeepers*, ed. Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 47.

B. INTERESTS AS JUSTIFICATION FOR PEACEKEEPING

Some theories indicate that states contribute to UN peacekeeping operations because they receive a financial benefit. There is a shift to developing states to provide a majority of the force for a UN peacekeeping operations. In 1990, three of the five top peacekeeping contributors were western states.⁶⁰ In December of 2016, the highest ranked western power is number 24.⁶¹ The donating states receive a payment from the UN for each day the soldier executes the UN mission, and the UN pays at a higher rate than the state pays their soldier at home.⁶² States are able to shift the burden of the cost of a soldier from the state to the UN. In addition, the UN provides for training of the personnel. Often times, the states receive donated equipment for the mission as well.⁶³ States are able to get military training, experience, and equipment at no cost to them; and they are able to shift the money they would have channeled into the military into domestic spending. This serves to increase the state's legitimacy at home and reduces the likelihood of a coup. The state is able to placate any domestic concerns by maintaining strong domestic investment.⁶⁴ The domestic investment improves the quality providing the regime with legitimacy, which reduces opposition.

Material and monetary incentives are weak explanations for participation. The UN is notoriously slow in making payments, and the payments are often low. For small countries the foreign capital can be a boon, but the difficulties and delays in receiving the funds often outweigh the benefits. The bureaucratic organization in the UN, which will be discussed later, for collecting and distributing funds associated with peacekeeping makes timely payments difficult as "Even Fiji has threatened to quit peacekeeping unless it is 'reimbursed' more promptly."⁶⁵ In addition, the contributing state is required to

⁶⁰ United Nations Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributor Archive, United Nations, accessed May 22, 2017, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Kathman and Melin, "Who Keeps the Peace? Understanding State Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations," 4.

⁶³ Findlay, "The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping," 7–10.

⁶⁴ Kathman and Melin, "Who Keeps the Peace? Understanding State Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations," 3–4.

⁶⁵ Findlay, "The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping," 9.

provide six months' worth of standard UN equipment. This can be cost prohibitive for many developing states.⁶⁶ The developing states' standard issue and the UN standards for general issue can be significantly different and require a large investment in uniform items and first aid equipment. In addition, the UN requirements for military personnel does not constitute an entire country's military, and since most countries only provide a small amount of personnel. Therefore, a government cannot fully shift the cost of their personnel to the UN.

Some participants in UN peacekeeping operations receive equipment donated by stronger states. Pakistan received vehicles from Germany for its role in Bosnia.⁶⁷ Any logistician will tell you what a mixed blessing that is. Vehicles that do not have lines of supply for replacement parts will become nothing better than displays with no operational value. The author has direct experience with this with the RG-31 Mine Resistance Ambush Protected vehicles. Procuring even routine parts in the supply chain for vehicles designed and built by foreign manufacturers was extremely difficult in Afghanistan. Some states will purchase vehicles for a UN mission with the expectation that that the UN will rent the vehicles from them. This is a risk as the peacekeeping mission could be discontinued prior to recouping the full cost of the equipment. In addition the investment could not pay off, as the equipment could not be well suited to the national defense needs of the state after the use with the UN mission.⁶⁸

Arguments for participating in peacekeeping operations to provide a state's military with operational experience or to improve civil military relations. These notions are also poor at explaining why states would participate in UN peacekeeping operations. Arturo Sotomayor demonstrates that states have mixed results as their levels of participation vary, some states provide large contingents or staff planners while others send only lower ranking personnel.⁶⁹ The norm changing expectations were not seen in many states as their militaries continued to act in illiberal manners and intervene in

⁶⁶ Daniel, "Contemporary Patterns in Peace Operations, 2000–2010," 56–57.

⁶⁷ Findlay, "The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping," 7–10.

⁶⁸ Daniel, "Contemporary Patterns in Peace Operations, 2000–2010," 57.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 192–193.

domestic affairs.⁷⁰ The expected results of “transparency, accountability ... and reorient[ation] of officers away from domestic politics” did not occur.⁷¹ The placing of potential military rivals to state power into peacekeeping operations in order to dislocate them from their powerbase is also faulty as many developing states contribute troops and not their senior leadership.⁷² The senior leadership staff is selected separately by the UN.⁷³ Those senior officers most likely to initiate a coup are not the ones being sent away.

Some scholars argue that states can improve their national security by participating in UN peacekeeping operations. Some scholars note that the leading troop contributing states are often engaged in interstate rivalry with a neighbor, and the ability to train the military and lack of restrictions on withdrawal enables them to rapidly pull troops back in the event of a crisis.⁷⁴ Return to their state will likely not be as easy as the authors imply. In the event of a conflict with another state, the enemy will likely seek to attack air capabilities. The UN, in an effort to de-escalate the conflict, will seek to block the ingress of additional combatants as well. In addition as the authors note, these states are developing and do not have the logistics capability to move large amounts of troops themselves and would require assistance. This makes this assumption of quick and easy withdrawal from UN duties back to their home country unlikely.

States frequently refer to the need to protect the international order as justification for intervention.⁷⁵ Civil unrest is feared to spread. Refugees from an intrastate conflict can move into another state and develop into a domestic issue for the new host country.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 194.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Kathman and Melin, “Who Keeps the Peace? Understanding State Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations,” 5.

⁷³ William J. Durch, “Running the Show: Planning and Implementation,” in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St Martin’s Press 1993), 62–63.

⁷⁴ Kathman and Melin, “Who Keeps the Peace? Understanding State Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations,” 3 and 6.

⁷⁵ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force*, 85.

As some states have multiple ethnic groups, an ethnic conflict across the border can drag the government into a response as it tries to protect its citizens.

Some researchers argue that small states might fear their security in an anarchical system, and seek to create a rule of law to bind stronger powers. For small, less powerful states, “a strong, reliable multilateral system is seen as essential, and there has been considerable self-interest in preserving the existence and credibility of the UN, to maintain the international rule of law and create safeguards against great-power abuse.”⁷⁶ Therefore, participation in the UN works as a restraint on the larger powers. Larger great powers will no longer be able to arbitrarily use their powers. Secondly, by participating in a multilateral organization that same organization will be more responsive in providing support should that state be in need. More research will need to be done to determine whether participation brought about better results in support of requests from the UN, specifically in regards to peacekeeping.

International prestige is often touted by leaders as they push their countries to participate in UN peacekeeping.⁷⁷ The social construct of international prestige is difficult to quantify, and when is it in the interest of the state to demonstrate compliance with international norms and more politically beneficial to deride convention and demonstrate a strong independent stance.⁷⁸ Many states deem it in their national interest to demonstrate their free will against the status quo. As Martha Finnemore articulates this concept presents problems. As she says, “order is material—it comes from the distribution of capabilities, with capabilities being understood as material resources ... in most periods of history, the distribution of capabilities is open to interpretation and that, in fact, similar distribution of material capabilities generate different understandings of order at different times.”⁷⁹ There is no way to accurately measure a state’s strengths or

⁷⁶ John Karlsrud and Kari M. Osland, “Between Self-Interest and Solidarity: Norway’s return to UN Peacekeeping,” *International Peace Keeping*, (2016), doi: 10.1080/13533312.2016.1235096, 5.

⁷⁷ Andrea Carati and Andrea Locatelli, “Cui Pordest? Italy’s Questionable Involvement in Multilateral Military Operations Amid Ethical Concerns and National Interest,” *International Peace Keeping*, (2016), doi: 10.1080/13533312.2016.1229127, 6.

⁷⁸ Carati and Locatelli, “Cui Pordest? Italy’s Questionable Involvement in Multilateral Military Operations Amid Ethical Concerns and National Interest,” 6.

⁷⁹ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force*, 87.

weaknesses or its willingness to use its strengths in a given situation. This forces leaders to act based on perceptions. At any given time, some leaders might view peacekeeping as a method of attaining international prestige, but another leader could come to a different conclusion about the future significance of the UN and seek to pull out of UN efforts.

C. IDENTITY DRIVING ALTRUISTICS AND HUMANITARIAN JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING

Gary Bass discusses identity as a key factor in determining whether a state will decide to intervene in a conflict. He demonstrates that a nation which has a similar identity with the victims is more likely to intercede in another state with a humanitarian mission.⁸⁰ Support to other peoples in other states grew from ethnic and national identities to include a connection based on shared humanity.⁸¹ Bass shows how the writings of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Burke transformed the way some elites viewed identity, changing their allegiance from ethnic or civic to that of a larger human connection.⁸² Martha Finnemore echoes this theory by stating “who is human has changed, that is, who can successfully claim humanitarian protection from strong states has changed.”⁸³ She argues that early interventions were often by strong power against weak powers. Many of the early humanitarian interventions were to support “white Christians against non-Christians. Over time intervention has evolved to include mostly non-white non-Christians.”⁸⁴ One of the key roles in developing the ties between the victims and the group seeking intervention is the media.⁸⁵ The media develops the linkages between peoples on a human level creating the impetus for action to help the people in need. The media and international organizations created empathy with the others and this had an effect on behavior.⁸⁶

⁸⁰ Bass, *Freedom's Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention*, 19.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 22.

⁸³ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* 53.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁸⁵ Bass, *Freedom's Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention*, 25.

⁸⁶ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force*, 144.

These normative changes in state behavior were developed over time. Changes in international behavior is tied to changes in state sovereignty and human rights norms.⁸⁷ The Westphalian argument of state sovereignty has frequently been challenged when states felt compelled to intervene on the behalf of perceived victims to whom they most related. Bass and Finnemore show international interventions in the 1840s when the Westphalians arguments held the most weight. The understanding of norms “change the way state decision makers understand what is desirable and how to attain it.”⁸⁸ The importance of human rights over state sovereignty in determining whether a state was to intervene in a peacekeeping operations used to be more tied to who was the victim and who was the aggressor, identity. The definition of threats to international peace and security were modified to include antidemocratic governments and human rights abusers.⁸⁹ Finnemore explains:

These changes in understandings about humanity and sovereignty obviously do much more than change humanitarian intervention. They alter the purpose of force broadly in world politics, changing the way people think about the legitimate and effective uses of state coercion in a variety of areas. Understandings that shape social purpose do not exist in a vacuum. Social purpose is formed by a dense web of social understandings that are logically and ethically interrelated and, at least to some degree mutually supporting.⁹⁰

Social movements led to changes in the interpretation and implementation of laws which “were crucial in transforming individual-level affect and cognitive changes into larger social structures.”⁹¹ These social movements created multilateral organizations which worked to change norms that redefined legitimate intervention practices.⁹²

Norway was an early leader in UN peacekeeping operations. Having been occupied throughout much of its history, it initially sought to establish international rules.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 57.

⁸⁸ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force*, 140.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 56.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 67.

⁹¹ Ibid., 144.

⁹² Ibid., 145.

Recently, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs discussed the reasons for participating in peacekeeping operations by stating, “This policy is based on a spirit of solidarity and long term perspective...”⁹³ Norway has sought to create an identity where they were connected to the global norms under the UN and attempted to foster that by producing “good works” under that system. Italian participation in peacekeeping is often equated to compliance with humanitarian doctrine concern for status, and protecting its national interests.⁹⁴ A British High Level Independent Panel on Peacekeeping Operations reported that the United Kingdom needed to increase its participation in peacekeeping operations or “the United Kingdom’s voice in international affairs will lose authority.”⁹⁵ The identity of the state is referred to frequently as justification for participating in peacekeeping operations.

D. UN PEACEKEEPING ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURES

The structures and organizations of the UN impacts how peacekeeping operations are created, manned, and equipped. Limitations within the UN creates restrictions and constraints on the UN that has implications on peacekeeping employment and the forces selected. This section examines the evolution of the UN as it navigated the Cold War and the transformation of norms.

1. The Organizations of the UN as it Applies to Peacekeeping

The United Nations, like its predecessor the League of Nations, is designed to provide collective security to its members; however, the UN has some inherent flaws in the organization that makes responding to a threat difficult. Although the UN charter called for collective security, it did not specifically address peacekeeping or peacekeeping operations signed in 1946.⁹⁶ The UN is divided into two main bodies: the

⁹³ Karlsrud and Osland, “Between Self-Interest and Solidarity: Norway’s return to UN Peacekeeping,” 5.

⁹⁴ Carati and Locatelli, “Cui Pordest? Italy’s Questionable Involvement in Multilateral Military Operations Amid Ethical Concerns and National Interest,” 6.

⁹⁵ David Curran and Paul Williams, “The United Kingdom and United Nations Peace Operations,” *International Peace Keeping*, (2016), doi: 10.1080/13533312.2016.1235098, 9.

⁹⁶ Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, 22.

General Assembly and the Security Council. The Security Council is the organization that is tasked with maintaining international peace and security. The Security Council has five permanent members and ten rotating positions.⁹⁷ The five permanent members were the major Allied powers during World War II: the Republic of China (ROC), the United Kingdom (U.K.), France, the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.), and the United States. The UN framework was designed to give the five major Allied powers control, with each having veto power on the Security Council. A veto by any one of these five will prevent a resolution: otherwise a majority vote will suffice to pass. This resolved the unanimous vote requirement that hamstrung the League of Nations. The Security Council is responsible for requesting peacekeeping operations from the Secretary General. The General Assembly has pushed peacekeeping operations through when the Security Council has reached an impasse.

The requirements for UN peacekeepers meant that the UN had to create a system to manage its responses. The General Secretary initially placed peacekeeping operations under the responsibility of two under-secretaries without portfolio for Special Political Affairs.⁹⁸ It was not until 1991, when the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was finally established as a separate organization within the UN.⁹⁹ The many responsibilities and aspects of peacekeeping operations had been divided up among the pre-existing organizations within the UN.¹⁰⁰ The Special Political Affairs sections planned missions. The Special Political Affairs had no voice in the command and execution of a mission nor were they consulted for coordinating instruction for negotiations to reduce the conflict.¹⁰¹ Inversely, the commander of the mission was not consulted on the plan developed by the Special Political Affairs section that he was tasked with enforcing.¹⁰²

⁹⁷ United Nations, Security Council, accessed 13 February 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/>.

⁹⁸ William J. Durch, "Running the Show: Planning and Implementation," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St Martin's Press 1993), 59.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 72.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 60.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 62–63.

The responsibility of the daily operations fell to the Field Operations Department, creating a third bureaucratic entity to navigate.¹⁰³ The Secretary General recruits member states for forces while the commander is appointed separately. The result is the commander does not meet their troops often until deployment.¹⁰⁴ With the increase in the number of missions, the UN sought to bring all manner of peacekeeping functions into one organization, creating a disjointed network that often provided diverging guidance and provided no unity of command. Figure 1 demonstrates the current structure.




Figure 1. United Nations Peacekeeping Authority Demonstrating Command and Control¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Dorch, "Running the Show: Planning and Implementation," 60.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 62–63.

¹⁰⁵ United Nations: Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, New York: United Nations Secretariat, 2008, 67.

2. How a UN Peacekeeping Operation Originates

The UN guidance and operating procedures are now formalized and illustrate how a mission is proposed, approved, manned, equipped, executed, and reconstituted in the 2008 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines.¹⁰⁶ The UN continues to re-evaluate the process and seek improvements. A state can request the UN to provide a peacekeeping force or even the General Assembly. The current process for a William Durch outlines an ideal administrative process for the formation of UN peacekeeping force:

1. The UN Security Council recommends that the Secretary General send afield survey teams to attempt to bring both sides of a conflict to negotiations.
2. The survey team reports back whether or not a peacekeeping operation is supported by both sides. If both sides deny, then peacekeeping is no longer an option and the Security Council will then vote on a peace enforcement operation.
3. The Security Council develops mission parameters.
4. The Security Council directs Secretary General to create a plan for size, structure, duties, and timing of the peacekeeping operation.
5. The Office of Special Political Affairs and Field Operations Division develop a plan.
6. The Security Council approves plan.
7. Field Operations Division develops a budget plan.
8. The Special Peacekeeping unit reviews the budget plan.
9. Presentation of the budget plan to the Financial Committee of the General Assembly.
10. Within the General Assembly, the Fifth Committee reviews the budget plan.
11. Fifth Committee submission to the General Assembly for approval.
12. The Secretary General solicits forces to support the operation.

¹⁰⁶ United Nations: Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (New York: United Nations Secretariat, 2008).

13. The forces assemble and train prior to deployment.

14. The forces move to the conflict area.¹⁰⁷

This process enables a mission to be established. Westphalian who are more likely to oppose current iterations of peacekeeping often intercede before step one to prevent a recommendation from coming from the Security Council, or during step six by vetoing s plan instead of approving it.

3. Constraints and Restraints on UN Peacekeeping

The UN budgeting cycle can be an obstacle to timely and effective deployment of peacekeepers. The UN does not create budgets for peacekeeping operations. Each mission assesses dues from member states.¹⁰⁸ The UN funds each operation separately and only for a short duration, which frequently requires multiple renewals. This process results in arrearages being delivered to UN member states twice a year for each UN peacekeeping operation.¹⁰⁹ If the request is not in the budget cycle of the country, then there can be delays in the UN receiving its funding. For example, the single largest financial contributor, the United States, of the total UN budget provides a single payment in the last fiscal quarter. Therefore, the UN receives 25% of its total budget in the 4th quarter. This means the UN does not have that money upfront so it can begin provisioning a peacekeeping operation immediately. In addition, the UN cannot borrow money.¹¹⁰ These impediments mean that the UN is not in a position to rapidly respond to a situation where peacekeepers would be warranted.

Costs associated with the initial deployment and sustainment of equipment impairs the rapid deployment of peacekeepers.¹¹¹ The UN views its peacekeeping operations as contingency missions and does not forecast or develop logistical or

¹⁰⁷ William J. Durch, "Paying the Tab: Financial Crisis," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St Martin's Press 1993), 47–48.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 40.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 40–41.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 48–49.

maintenance plans for current or future equipment.¹¹² The UN also experiences delays because the troops and equipment are often donated separately.¹¹³ Troops are often from the developing world while the equipment donated is often from western Europeans and the United States. The troops require some training to learn how to operate the equipment prior to using it in their assigned operations. UN requires, an often near Western standard of equipment, especially in regards to medical care. However, a significant bulk of the costs for operations are on the troop contributing states themselves.¹¹⁴ A soldier contributed to the UN is expected to show up with enough basic issue clothing and equipment to not need sustainment for six months. The first aid kits should be up to western standards of aid, and the equipment must be in functional condition. These requirements mean that many developing states choose not to provide troops as the costs are prohibitive, and many Western states also choose to not contribute troops as they feel the standards are too low.

Another constraint on effective peacekeeping is the perception of legitimacy. There are two key factors for peacekeeping legitimacy: capability and neutrality. The UN has, at times, struggled with methods of fielding a force capable of executing the mandate and in creating the appearance of neutrality.

The peacekeepers convoluted chains of command sometimes contradicted the appearance of neutrality. Peacekeepers often report back to their home country for guidance. The ability of the home country to impart direction to its personnel supporting a peacekeeping operation could create a perception that the strict neutrality had been violated.¹¹⁵ UN peacekeeping operations with vague mandates were often an indication of the major powers interests not agreeing on a specific plan for the mandate.¹¹⁶ The divergent great power interests forced the writers of the mandates to use language that

¹¹² Durch, "Running the Show: Planning and Implementation," 67.

¹¹³ Ibid., 66.

¹¹⁴ Durch, "Paying the Tab: Financial Crisis," 40.

¹¹⁵ Durch, "Running the Show: Planning and Implementation," 62–63.

¹¹⁶ William J. Durch, "Getting Involved: Political-Military Context," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St Martin's Press 1993), 26.

each side could settle on. This approach could benefit the peacekeeping forces because the ambiguity allowed time for states to build consensus, or it even permitted states to “lend support without endorsing.”¹¹⁷ States could accentuate the portions that met their interests and downplay the negatives enabling broader state participation.

E. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The norms for peacekeeping have changed overtime. Peacekeeping practices and UN employment of peacekeeping operations have evolved in response to changing norms. Westphalian arguments dominated UN thoughts and influenced its practices until the fall of the Soviet Union. This evolution is demonstrated in UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War focusing on interstate conflicts and modern peacekeeping operations predominantly dealing with intrastate conflicts. Humanitarian intervention has a long history even prior to the UN; states would have often intervene in the borders of other states to aid people.¹¹⁸ The UN has evolved its peacekeeping operations over time to match changing norms and power politics after the Cold War.¹¹⁹

The League of Nations did have a few successful peacekeeping interventions, prior to its demise, which provided the parameters for UN peacekeeping. These parameters were the requirement for a ceasefire prior to the force arriving, strict neutrality, a fact finding to ensure that peacekeeping would be permitted, and the authority to negotiate with the parties.¹²⁰ The goal of peacekeeping forces is to act as a buffer between belligerents. The peacekeepers do not hold territory and are present as a confidence-building tool in the ceasefire agreement; they often lack resources to perform the actual enforcement.¹²¹ Peacekeepers are often tasked with patrols to find violations of agreements, observe withdrawals, resolve conflicts, perform some law and governmental functions, and pursue humanitarian efforts such as providing health services.¹²²

¹¹⁷ Durch, “Getting Involved: Political-Military Context,” 28.

¹¹⁸ Bass, *Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention*, 4.

¹¹⁹ Durch, “Introduction,” 1.

¹²⁰ Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, 17–18.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 5 and 10.

1. Westphalian Norms' Pre-eminence during the Cold War

There was an escalation of conflicts, during the Cold War, along interstate boundaries and the UN engaged in peacekeeping operations to mitigate those. These operations fit into the Westphalian norms of the pre-eminence of state sovereignty. The geopolitical pressures during the Cold War saw the collapse of traditional empires and the dividing of areas of influence into western aligned, communist aligned and non-aligned states. The competition between the Soviet Union and the United States saw developing states receiving aid in order to join one side or another. Some adroit states were able to play the two Cold Warriors off of one another and receive aid from both.

The first test of UN peacekeeping came with the fall of the colonial empires. The conflicts between nationalist movements and colonial empires created political and humanitarian crises that were greater than the newly independent states could handle.¹²³ The UN did not have peacekeeping policies initially. The UN created mandates to provide peacekeepers to separate the exiting colonial powers from the newly created national governments and their fighters. European Empires were losing legitimacy in their former colonies and no longer capable of exerting force across the globe. The UN applied Westphalian principles of state sovereignty to the countries that were forming in conflict to their old colonial rulers and internally such as the operations in Congo, Angola, Namibia, India-Pakistan, West New Guinea, and Cypress.¹²⁴ Other Cold War conflicts flared up as the Soviet Union and the United States vied for supremacy in Lebanon, Yemen, and Israel- Egypt.¹²⁵

The UN peacekeepers were deployed to stop interstate conflicts along borders of these newly independent states. The poorly defined borders were frequently contested as each side vied for control of territory and the resources it contained. Belligerent nations were often supported by the superpowers. This meant that a small border war had the

¹²³ Durch, "Introduction," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, 1.

¹²⁴ United Nations, Peace Keeping Operations, *List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2013*, accessed 21 September 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf>.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

potential to escalate into a superpower war. The superpowers fearing the consequences sought the help from the UN to de-escalate tensions.

2. Post-Westphalian Dominance after the Cold War

UN Peacekeeping evolved again during the Cold War.¹²⁶ The two superpowers acted as stabilizing agents in their support for developing states, during the Cold War. The power battle for resources and international prestige, ended when the Soviet Union collapsed. The United States and the now Russian Federation retrenched on their foreign policy commitments, no longer provided the support to the developing world they once did. The developing world no longer held the strategic importance to the superpowers. This re-evaluation of vital interests left some of the fragile states on the periphery without the support they once received and so badly needed to maintain control of their populations. This retrenchment left some states in disarray without a patron. The disarray has led to a significant increase in UN peacekeeping operations since the end of the Cold War.

The post-Cold War saw a proliferation of intrastate conflicts. The UN underwent a norm change away from the priority of state sovereignty favored by the Westphalians to that of individual human rights as called for by the post-Westphalians. The UN has adopted new norms that call for greater intervention into domestic affairs of a state and has responded by becoming more involved in intrastate conflicts.

Post Westphalian arguments for the inclusion of human rights and the concept of the responsibility to protect civilians is a newer debate that has gained traction in the UN and is now being included in mandates.¹²⁷ The Western powers that have come to dominate UN politics in the post-Cold War have actively inserted these notions into UN peacekeeping mandates. The UN has been responsive to the great powers. Of the 26 major peacekeeping operations, six were initiated by the Security Council, and seven

¹²⁶ Trevor Findlay, "The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping," in *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*, SIPRI Research Report 12, ed. Trevor Findlay (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 1.

¹²⁷ United Nations General Assembly, Security Council, *The Future of the United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations*, General Assembly, 17 session. New York: Security Council, 2015.

were brokered behind the scenes by the United States.¹²⁸ Slightly over half of all peacekeeping operations were initiated by the major powers.¹²⁹ The UN has been attentive to the lessons learned and modified its practices to meet the superpower constraints.

The post-Cold War era of peacekeeping operations came after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This development led to a four-fold increase in UN peacekeeping operations by 1992 as shown in Figure 2.¹³⁰




Figure 2. The Number of UN Peacekeeping Operations Approved by the UN per Year 1971–2016.¹³¹

¹²⁸ Durch, “Introduction,” 16–17.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 16–17.

¹³⁰ Durch, “Epilogue: Peacekeeping in Uncharted Territory,” in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, 463.

¹³¹ Data construed from: United Nations, Security Council, accessed 13 February 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/searchvote.asp>; <http://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990610.SC6686.html>; <http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?profile=voting&index=.VM&term=sres1244>.

Post-Westphalians have urged the UN to become more adept at conflict prevention. Several UN General Secretaries, beginning in 2001, urged studies and practices to be enable the UN to act to prevent humanitarian crisis. A nongovernmental organization, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) established used the General Secretary Kofi Annan's call to develop a three pronged plan to reduce man-made humanitarian conflict.¹³² The ICISS's report outlined three key responsibilities: "prevent, react, rebuild" which have been summed up as the responsibility to protect.¹³³ The 2005 UN World Summit carried out a lively debate before ultimately adopting the revised principles.¹³⁴ Westphalians complained against the "internationalization" of a conflict in which neighboring states could request an intervention based on undefined and unclear "threats."¹³⁵ The second fear of small and developing states was that an intervention might legitimize a rebel group and grant them negotiating rights.¹³⁶ The UN again debated the principles again in the General Assembly in 2009 agreeing to "continue their consideration of the responsibility to protect but stopped short of mentioning any concrete plans for implementation."¹³⁷

Westphalian arguments for prioritizing state sovereignty have been re-evaluated in recent years. The complex forces acting on fragile states has led to an expanding understanding of peace and non-traditional security issues. This has brought about a call for more frequent intervention into the domestic matters of states. Martha Finnemore explains "states that abuse citizens in massive or systemic ways are now viewed as security threats both because the flows of refugees and social tensions that such policies create are destabilizing to neighbors and because aggressive behavior internally is seen as

¹³² Alex J. Bellamy, "Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect," *Global Governance* 14, no. 2 (2008): 135–36.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 135.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 138.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ Serena K. Sharma, "Toward a Global Responsibility to Protect: Setbacks on the Path to Implementation," review of "The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocities Once and for All," by Gareth Evans and "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect by UN Secretary-General," by Alex J. Bellamy, *Global Governance* 16, no. 1 (2010): 133.

an indicator of the capacity to behave aggressively externally.”¹³⁸ Post-Westphalians argue that intervention into the domestic actions of a state are warranted because the domestic actions of a state can have repercussion beyond their borders. The notion of state sovereignty and equality among states as being paramount is being replaced with notions of regional peace and stability. In turn, the requirement for peace and stability has brought about the need for greater peacekeeping operations. The UN Peacekeeping Guidelines describe how peacekeeping operations have evolved from the Westphalian model to the post-Westphalian model of peacekeeping:

A technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has halted, and to assist in the implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements—military, police, and civilian—working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.¹³⁹

UN Westphalian models of observing the cease fire are still in effect in India-Pakistan, Cyprus, Israel-Egypt, and Lebanon to the 2103 “multidimensional integrated stabilization mission in Mali.”¹⁴⁰ Post-Westphalians argue that states can and should work to create regional security by intervening in inter and intrastate conflicts has been winning out over the old Westphalian practices. The understanding of threats to global security have changed.

F. CONCLUSION

Understanding the motivations for states’ participation in peacekeeping operations has changed. Early assessments used international relations theory based on neo-realism principles which provides geostrategic, economic, or both as the predominant factors.¹⁴¹ Balance of power theory indicates that “powerful states have always intervened to

¹³⁸ Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 2003), 135.

¹³⁹ United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 18.

¹⁴⁰ United Nations, Peace Keeping Operations, *List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2013*, accessed 21 September 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf>.

¹⁴¹ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force*), 52.

promote an order or to protect the status quo that suits them.”¹⁴² This concept indicates that major powers would use their power to manipulate smaller states to ensure that their hegemony is secure. Early UN peacekeeping operations often required strong powers pressuring allies to support missions. The major powers would not contribute personnel to a mission so as to maintain the veneer of neutrality.¹⁴³ Finnemore argues that realist geopolitical power balancing does not adequately address why strong states are involved in peacekeeping because interventions occur in states that have limited geostrategic, economic importance to the great powers, and therefore do not trigger a national security interest for most major powers.¹⁴⁴ The major and minor powers continue to support peacekeeping operations in regions and countries that do not provide a direct benefit to them.

Peacekeeping operations themselves have evolved over time to match the changes in norms. Today, a majority of states consider the most legitimate form of peacekeeping as a multilateral approach often through the UN that attempts to maintain its neutrality, is limited in the use of force, and is not beholden to any of the major powers. The peacekeeping is often torn between the competing ideas of the Westphalians, who place state sovereignty as paramount over other considerations, and the post-Westphalians, who regard human life as the primary concern. This conflict has shaped how the UN creates a peacekeeping mandate and how the UN can deploy its peacekeepers.

The UN has been evolving the method of creating its peacekeeping forces as well as the mandates that drive them. The Cold War heavily influenced what peacekeeping operations would be approved and who could execute them. The geo-political pressures have caused a change in UN peacekeeping. Early peacekeeping mandates were to use UN observers as a buffer for interstate conflicts. The post-Cold War mandates send UN peacekeepers to participate in multifaceted humanitarian and state building operations in response to the intrastate conflicts. The UN has struggled to create a coherent method of handling the increasingly frequent requirements for peacekeepers. The ad hoc recruitment

¹⁴² Ibid., 85.

¹⁴³ Trevor Findlay, “The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping,” 7.

¹⁴⁴ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force*, 52.

and funding continues to hamper and delay the response of critically needed personnel during a humanitarian crisis. Proposals for corrections have begun to gain momentum. The UN has created a permanent peacekeeping department, and states are beginning to provide trained fast-response forces to the UN.

The UN will continue to evolve its approaches to peacekeeping in response to the geo-political pressures and as influences and lessons learned change. The peacekeeping operations of today are often deeply rooted in normative values with many open-ended, long-term tasks aimed at aiding failing states. The normative values built into the modern mandates expect both the peacekeeping states and the states receiving aid to accept the normative values.

III. CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD UN PEACEKEEPING

This chapter examines the dominant factors that contributed to changes in Chinese foreign policy regarding UN peacekeeping. As described in the introduction, the two factors to be examined are self-interest and identity. As discussed in Chapter two, the single component of self-interest most influential in changing policy towards peacekeeping is security. Also explored in chapter two is the concept of identity as it is used to accept norms. This thesis uses Yongjin Zhang's framework of phases to examine and explain how Chinese foreign policy has changed. He describes four phases: phase 1, from 1950–1971, as a period of condemnation of all UN peacekeeping efforts; and phase 2, from 1971 to 1981, as a period of non-interference; phase 3, from 1981–1988, as a period of cooperation for UN peacekeeping efforts; and phase 4, from 1988 to the present, as a policy of participation. Realist concepts of self-interests as it pertains to balance of power theories explain some periods, and constructivist theories on identity best explain the change in other periods of Chinese policy towards UN peacekeeping operations.

This chapter will explain that Chinese communist ideology was the dominant factor during phase one. These domestic identity factors created external political threats that forced the Chinese Communist Party to change its policies. As the political situation adjusted to the shifting policies, China became less antagonistic towards UN peacekeeping operations during phase two. Phase two was a period of non-intervention as China became more integrated into world politics and took a seat in the United Nations at the Security Council. Once again, China was limited in its security situation as a *détente* between the U.S. and USSR left it isolated, and it sought to create additional security institutions to protect its interests. This enabled China to move from a position of non-intervention to one of cooperation in regards to UN peacekeeping. As China's status improved and its interests in the world adjusted, China sought to demonstrate that it was a "responsible power" and transitioned from cooperation to participation in UN peacekeeping beginning in 1988 to the present. The improvements in the Chinese

economy and increasing self-assurance in China gave the CCP the impetus to demonstrate that China is a “great power” capable of supporting the established institutions while at the same time restricting Western power’s influence within the UN. China would continue to oppose intrusions on sovereignty by maintaining Westphalian principles. China has sought to do this through greater cooperation within the UN peacekeeping organizations and institutions. Table 2 demonstrates the dominant factor that influenced Chinese policy towards UN peacekeeping operations.

Table 2. Dominant Policy Factors Influencing Chinese Foreign Policy toward UN Peacekeeping

Phase	1 1950–1971 Opposition	2 1971–1981 Non-interference	3 1981–1988 Cooperation	4 1988–Present Participation
Dominant Factor	Identity	Self-interest	Self-interest	Identity

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This section argues that the framework for the Chinese Communist identity as seen in phase one of policy towards UN peacekeeping was established through its early interaction with western imperial powers and during World War II. Chinese identity in the 1700 and 1800s is best described by Zheng Wang when he strings together three common descriptions of how the Chinese described themselves and their land into one sentence: “Chosen people who lived in a sacred land at the center of the world.”¹⁴⁵ Chinese viewed themselves as special, their culture and heritage had been supreme for thousands of years. Other peoples may have conquered them, but the foreigners assimilated to Chinese practices and teachings. This identity conflicted with the equally centrist British Empire. The British ambassador to China, Lord Macartney, confided in someone that he believed the Chinese will see, “the superiority which Englishmen,

¹⁴⁵ Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 43.

wherever they go, cannot conceal.”¹⁴⁶ This inherent belief in the greatness of each side meant that any dealings with one another had a high probability of conflict. The next ambassador to China, after Lord Macartney, was not even received by the Chinese court.¹⁴⁷ The British next sent Lord Napier to negotiate with China, but he quickly violated all protocols by heading straight to Canton without first registering his request at the correct location with the correct organization.¹⁴⁸ Lord Napier believed that his status as a British diplomat granted him exemption from Chinese bureaucratic rules and traditions. This led the Chinese to boycott all British trade and tensions escalated igniting the First Opium War.¹⁴⁹ This launched what the Chinese termed as the “Century of Humiliation,”¹⁵⁰ or repeated Western military incursions into sovereign Chinese territory to gain economic and political advantages over the Chinese government. The outbreak of the Chinese Civil War saw foreign powers become less overtly obtrusive in Chinese politics and began to work more through existing Chinese political organizations rather than military incursions.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) struggled to attain ascendancy in Chinese politics because of the interference of foreign powers. The Chinese Civil War was not strictly an internal affair. The world powers picked favorites and attempted to support one faction over the other. The National Socialist Party in Germany, the Soviet Union, and later the United States all provided support to the Guomindang Nationalist Party at different times.¹⁵¹ The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) often advised their fellow communists in the CCP to compromise with the Guomindang.¹⁵² China noted the advice to compromise and meek levels of support provided by the Soviet Union. The Chinese Civil War, which took a hiatus to unite both the major factions against the

¹⁴⁶ Conrad Schirokauer and Donald N. Clark, *Modern East Asia: A Brief History*, 2d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008), 124.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 124.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 126.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 126.

¹⁵⁰ Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation*, 43.

¹⁵¹ Schirokauer and Clark, *Modern East Asia*, 300.

¹⁵² Ibid., 325.

Japanese, resumed after World War II (WWII). The CCP's communist benefactors, the USSR, provided limited support, and the Soviets urged the CCP to compromise with the Guomindang, even as the U.S. was pouring supplies and equipment into the Guomindang.¹⁵³ The Guomindang received a larger proportion of international assistance compared to the CCP. Despite the material advantages of the Guomindang, the CCP was able to defeat the Guomindang in the civil war and successfully established the People's Republic of China (PRC). The losing Guomindang party escaped to Taiwan and established the Republic of China (ROC). Just one year after forming, the PRC felt compelled to warn the United States and its United Nations allies that the intervention in the Korean Civil War would provoke a Chinese intervention if they crossed the border of the 38th parallel, as established after WWII. The Chinese provided warnings to the UN that they would intervene if the UN forces approached the Yalu River. These warnings were not heeded and China attacked the UN forces, which prolonged the war for another two years.¹⁵⁴

The CCP's identity, from its inception and throughout its early development, has been shaped by international forces. The UN did not concede the realities on the ground and failed to transition the Security Council seat from the ROC to the PRC. The Chinese and especially the CCP had learned to suspect foreign and international organizations' intentions with the UN intervention in Korea. This deep distrust, imbedded in the Communist ideology with Chinese Characteristics, manifested itself in Chinese foreign policy.

B. PHASE 1, OPPOSITION, 1950–1971: IDENTITY

This section argues that the communist ideological beliefs framed Chinese foreign policy towards UN peacekeeping operations from 1950 to 1971. Liberal constructivist theories seek to demonstrate that states like individuals are subject to changes in perception. Benedict Anderson describes how nationalism is a cultural creation of

¹⁵³ Schirokauer and Clark, *Modern East Asia*, 325.

¹⁵⁴ Chin-Hao Huang, "Principles and Praxis of China's Peacekeeping," in *China's Evolving Approach to UN Peacekeeping*, ed. Marc Lanteigne and Miwa Hirono (New York: Routledge, 2012), 16.

“historical forces” that are forged by political and ideological concepts.¹⁵⁵ As Anderson details, communities share the experience of time, status, and location, which are then transformed into meaning.¹⁵⁶ His title *Imagined Communities*, demonstrates how people choose to identify themselves as part of a group despite having only limited actual ties to that group. Groups are tied together by their shared understandings of the past. Zheng Wang concurs that historical memory is a significant factor in creating identity in China.¹⁵⁷ Martha Finnemore expands the constructivist theories to apply to international relations when she states: “States do not always know what they want. They and the people in them develop perceptions of interest and understandings of desirable behavior from social interactions with others in the world they inhabit.”¹⁵⁸ Peter Seixas describes how societies build a collective or shared memory, “the writing of history, and other modes of shaping images of the past in the public mind mere,... [encompassing] individual and collective understandings of the past, the cognitive and cultural factors that shape those understandings, as well as the relations of historical understandings to those of the present and future.”¹⁵⁹ China built a historical narrative through its control of the media and education.

The Chinese government has outlined the importance of using the media to shape culture which in turn provides the party with legitimacy and social control.¹⁶⁰ The importance of the media in pushing the party/ government message is seen in the regulatory stipulation that, “The media has a political role in disseminating correct public

¹⁵⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 2d ed. (New York: Verso, 1991), 4.

¹⁵⁶ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 53.

¹⁵⁷ Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation*, 27- 36.

¹⁵⁸ Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), 126.

¹⁵⁹ Peter Seixas, ed., *Theorizing Historical Consciousness* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 10, quoted in Eric Langenbacher, “Collective Memory as a Factor in Political Culture and International Relations,” in *Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations*, ed. Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 27.

¹⁶⁰ Rogier Creemers, “Evaluating Chinese Media Policy: Objectives and Contradictions,” in *Routledge Handbook of Chinese Media*, ed. Gary D. Rawnsley and Ming-Yeh T. Rawnsley, (New York; Routledge, 2003), 49.

opinion, ensuring that development is ‘healthy,’ and morality is maintained.¹⁶¹ The government is the final arbiter of correct public opinion, and “although the Chinese constitution provides for freedom of expression, it is not enforceable in court.¹⁶² The Chinese Communist Party is able to design and craft the messages that will be broadcast to the Chinese population and block any dissenting voices.

The Chinese media are controlled by a complex labyrinth of regulations as established by “party organs, state departments, state owned enterprises, and industrial associations.¹⁶³ Chinese regulations reject western values that are used to govern the media in liberal democracies such as pluralism, impartiality, and free expression.¹⁶⁴ The Chinese Communist Party created a policy of “public opinion supervision,” in 1987, under the premise that the masses must understand the major issues in order to have a dialogue.¹⁶⁵ The 1989 democracy protest led to a new policy “public opinion guidance.”¹⁶⁶ The new propaganda chief’s policy guidance encouraged “newspaper reports should mainly report and propagate positive matters, criticism should be concentrated on items that can be resolved and critical reporting should include information on the resolution of the problem.”¹⁶⁷ The institution reforms to both structure and rules after the democracy movements have been designed to ensure that the communist party maintains hegemony over content and the actor who produce and distribute public expression.¹⁶⁸ Rogier Creemers explains that China’s “aim is not to create a framework of rules and principles that clarify the rights and obligations of all concerned parties, within which individual actors can pursue their own objectives, but to manage the sphere of public communications in support of a specific set of political

¹⁶¹ Rogier Creemers, “Evaluating Chinese Media Policy: Objectives and Contradictions,” 48.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 48.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 48, 54.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 48.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 52.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 52–53.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 53.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 54.

objectives.”¹⁶⁹ This is the antithesis of the interaction between government and media in liberal democracies. The Chinese government established a system in which they can arbitrarily control the messages produced. Creemers elucidates, “The structuring of media governance through administrative regulation has created an environment in which the rules can change rapidly and unpredictably. The prioritization of political objectives over other interests, combined with a lack of checks, balances, and accountability.”¹⁷⁰ The media is not free to create its own agency, but instead is forced to produce the message of the government. The message, depending on its importance, is either “supervised” to ensure that it does stray away from the intent, or the message is “guided” to ensuring that it closely aligns with the political goals.

China combined nationalism with its communism to oppose the UN and its peacekeeping efforts. China used the narrative of the “Century of Humiliation” to build a common imagined communion of individuals, beyond those who are intimately known, with “a deep horizontal comradeship” grounded in cultural connections.¹⁷¹ The average Chinese person knows and understands the impact of foreign intervention on Chinese history. China has worked to ensure that the concepts of foreign intervention and unfair treatment of China has seeped into the national consciousness. This has influenced how it has interacted with international organizations such as the UN.

Chinese identity of being held back by the great powers led them to oppose international organizations, like the UN, that were controlled by the great powers. The PRC’s initial interactions with the UN combined with its view that the institution was “a U.S. controlled headquarters of international gendarmes to suppress and stamp out revolutionary struggles of the world’s people,” clearly indicated an adversarial relationship.¹⁷² The communist leadership in China repeatedly criticized the UN, claiming that the UN was under the influence of “a few big powers; sovereignty of other

¹⁶⁹ Rogier Creemers, “Evaluating Chinese Media Policy: Objectives and Contradictions,” 54.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 58.

¹⁷¹ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 6–7.

¹⁷² Gary D. Rawnsley, “May You Live in Interesting Times: China, Japan and Peacekeeping,” in *Major Powers and Peacekeeping: Perspectives*, ed. Rachel E. Utley (Leeds, U.K.: Ashgate, 2006), 83.

nations, particularly small ones, is bought and sold there by them like shares.”¹⁷³ China’s condemnation of the UN was based on its past exclusion and fear of the UN once again turning its powers against the PRC and the influence that former colonial powers wielded within the UN. China’s ideological framework guided their beliefs that the U.S. would manipulate the UN peacekeeping operations to oppress groups opposed to the U.S.’s interests.

Post World War II saw two great powers emerge—the U.S. and the USSR—and ignite the Cold War.

The Cold War is a term that characterizes the hostile relationship that developed first in Europe and then in Asia and other parts of the world as a result of the intensified struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union in the latter half of the 1940s. While loosely employed, “the term had an exceedingly important connotation: it called attention to the fact that, however acute their rivalry and conflict, the two sides were pursuing it by means short of another war and that, it was hoped, they would continue to do so.”¹⁷⁴

Neo-realists argue that states would seek to align with other states to prevent the growth of a regional hegemon.¹⁷⁵ The Cold War saw a similar alignment initially as the two dominant ideologies divided the world into capitalists versus communists. The more a state feels threatened, the more likely it will take action to protect its interests. A separate phenomena was taking place, as the colonies began to break free many sought a third path: one of nonalignment. Many former colonies, now independent states, did not see the benefits of joining the Cold War, despite the invitations, and sought instead to develop their own economies. They often rejected the capitalism that had driven their old colonial masters and did not see the benefit of a communist style of government.

The PRC began working with other developing nations and newly de-colonized states that were feeling pressured between the bi-polar international diplomacy of the

¹⁷³ Yongjin Zhang, “China and UN Peacekeeping: From Condemnation to Participation,” *International Peacekeeping*, 3:3 (1996), doi: 10.1080/13533319608413620, 3.

¹⁷⁴ Suisheng Zhao, *Power Competition in East Asia: From the Old Chinese World Order to Post-Cold War Regional Multipolarity* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 83–84.

¹⁷⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2014), 13.

Soviet Union and the United States. China felt the interests of developing countries were not just being manipulated in the UN by U.S.'s actions, but also by those of the Soviets: "The United Nations has long been controlled by the United States and has today become a place where two big powers, The United States and the Soviet Union, conduct political transactions."¹⁷⁶ The invitation of the PRC to conferences, such as the Asian-African Bandung Conference and the Geneva Conference on Indochina, demonstrates the international non-aligned communities' growing acceptance of the PRC as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people.¹⁷⁷ Despite some initial reservations about having an avidly communist nation at the Bandung Conference in 1955, China successfully assuaged the fears of the other conference attendees and helped re-articulate the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence as the guiding principles of China's foreign policy.¹⁷⁸ The five principles of "mutual respect of territory and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual noninterference in internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence," were derived from a country that had a semi-colonial past and feared outside interference.¹⁷⁹ This message strongly resonated with other states that shared a similar history of colonial control. The PRC built an identity around non-alignment.

The exclusion of the PRC from the UN and the isolation from within the communist movement, which will be discussed in the next section, gave China an identity as an outsider in the global community. This further permitted the non-alignment principles that it adhered to. However, the failure of the Cultural Revolution and economic stagnation within China combined with the new Soviet threat pushed the Chinese to change their ideological arguments. The "Soviet social-imperialism" became the new number one threat and the U.S. status as an enemy was downgraded.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁶ Zhang, "China and UN Peacekeeping: From Condemnation to Participation," 3.

¹⁷⁷ Schirokauer and Clark, *Modern East Asia*, 357.

¹⁷⁸ Zhang, "China and UN Peacekeeping: From Condemnation to Participation," 6.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁸⁰ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 243.

C. PHASE 2, NON-INTERVENTION, 1971–1981: SELF-INTEREST

Analysis indicates that domestic changes concerning the supremacy of Chinese communist thought combined with changing balance of power concerns regarding the Sino-Soviet Split created opportunities for China to adjust its foreign policy towards UN peacekeeping from 1971 to 1981. China had a strong break from its previous stance of opposition to a period of nonintervention from 1971 to 1981 to UN peacekeeping operations. The break was a result of an identity shift brought about by the souring of foreign relations with the Soviet Union. Vladimir Lenin, as described by M. Kulichenko, outlines how important historicism is in understanding foreign relations among states. According to Kulichenko, Marxist-Leninist methodology lists some key principles that determine international relations: culture is malleable, internal and external events contribute to an international relationship, the perspectives of each party will shape a relationship, and relationships can be modified over time.¹⁸¹ These principles explain how China has modified its foreign policy in regards to UN peacekeeping. These pressures created a shift of alliances which ultimately led to China's inclusion in the UN and initiated policies changes towards UN peacekeeping operations.

The two communist giants, China and the Soviet Union, began fighting over the direction of international communism in the late 1950s and eventually resulted in the outbreak of military hostilities in 1969.¹⁸² China, a developing state, now had an adversary that had used force against other communist aligned states on its border. China looked for assistance in the international community.¹⁸³ The PRC looked to balance the Soviet threat, and the U.S. was keen to further isolate the Soviet Union. At the same time, in the wake of the failure of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, China began transforming its ideology from being a supporter of global revolution to becoming more willing to work within the established global social order.¹⁸⁴ The Cultural Revolution was an attempt to maintain the iconoclastic communist revolution and to prevent the

¹⁸¹ Kulichenko, *Nations and Social Progress*, 25.

¹⁸² Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold*, 80–84.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 147, 159, 239.

¹⁸⁴ Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, 244.

establishment of vested interests by destroying vestiges of class and emphasizing local self-sufficiency.¹⁸⁵ The excesses of the Cultural Revolution created a major setback for the communist identity.

The communist leadership re-evaluated its isolating ideological identity in the 1970s. The Chinese leadership realized that its hardline ideologically driven policies had significantly worsened the security predicament. China was now in opposition to its erstwhile biggest ally the Soviet Union. The antagonism between the two communist powers increased until there was a border skirmish in 1969.¹⁸⁶ China determined that its security threat was more significant than its ideological differences and worked to create a rapprochement with the United States. The China- U.S. rapprochement brought about a stronger security position and “opened the way for China’s admission into the United Nations.”¹⁸⁷

The admission of the PRC into the UN Security Council altered China’s perception of its identity in relation to the UN. China’s outright condemnation of United Nations international peacekeeping operations ended in October 1971 when the UN revoked the ROC’s ability to represent the state of China and the PRC was given the position in the UN.¹⁸⁸ China transitioned from being an outsider decrying injustice to a full member. The previous identity could not be shed overnight and China compromised with a policy of non-intervention in which China would abstain on votes regarding UN peacekeeping operations. In the first UN vote for a peacekeeping operation with the PRC in the Security Council, in December of 1971, China voiced its opposition to all UN peacekeeping operations, but abstained from the vote.¹⁸⁹ This policy was later clarified with the next vote on a peacekeeping mission in 1973, when China representative, Huang Hua, stated that peacekeeping operations “only pave the way for further international

¹⁸⁵ Schirokauer and Clark, *Modern East Asia*, 368–370.

¹⁸⁶ Jian, *Mao’s China and the Cold War*, 240–41.

¹⁸⁷ James Mann, *About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 51.

¹⁸⁸ Zhang, “China and UN Peacekeeping: From Condemnation to Participation,” 2.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.

intervention and control with the superpowers as the behind-scenes-boss.”¹⁹⁰ Hua went on to state that because of the requests from the victims of aggression for UN peacekeeping forces, “China was not in a position to veto the resolution.”¹⁹¹ In addition, the PRC announced that since they opposed peacekeeping operations, it would not contribute to the costs incurred in such operations.¹⁹² The PRC, now that it was included in the UN, saved face by continuing its opposition to UN peacekeeping but thanked the establishment by abstaining and allowing the status quo to continue. The PRC’s policy of “cooperation through non-interference” constituted three parts: China would not debate in the Security Council; China would not veto resolutions; and China would not contribute with personnel or financially.¹⁹³ The PRC did not completely reverse its positions once included in the UN, it maintained its identity as a non-aligned country upholding Westphalian principles. Despite China’s previous rhetoric of condemnation of the UN, the PRC did not act as an impediment to peacekeeping operations. This was in keeping with its non-alignment principles; ensuring that it did not side with either of the superpowers.¹⁹⁴ China maintained its identity as an independent state by not supporting the superpowers and also by proclaiming to be helping its fellow developing states by not opposing or supporting UN peacekeeping operations.

D. PHASE 3, COOPERATION, 1981–1988: SELF-INTEREST

Analysis indicates security concerns continued to guide Chinese foreign policy towards UN peacekeeping from 1981 to 1988. Self-interest in the early 1980s pushed the PRC to find institutional protection to improve its security. Souring relations with the United States and continued animosity with the Soviet Union left China with few global partners. China was responding to the Taiwan Relations Act passed in Congress that articulated that the U.S. would sell Taiwan weapons of the quantity and quality necessary

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 6.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Yin He, “China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations,” *Institute for Security Development Policy* (2007): 19.

to defend Taiwan from aggression.¹⁹⁵ China re-evaluated its role in the international community, especially in respect to the strongly oppositional rhetoric emanating from the United States, and its growing requirement for resources to support its expanding economy.¹⁹⁶ In 1984, China signaled its change in policy when the Chinese deputy representative announced in the UN Security Council that China would seek “to strengthen the role of the United Nations,” to meet the demand for international peacekeeping operations.¹⁹⁷ China had made its third transition. This enabled China to move from non-intervention in which they did not oppose UN peacekeeping operations to a policy of cooperation where China now funded and observed UN peacekeeping missions.

China’s foreign policy is disjointed because of its competing domestic requirements. China needs to appear to the world that it is a responsible power in order to continue to garner foreign investment and consumption to grow the economy; however, Chinese leaders also must demonstrate that they are going to stand up to foreign influence to defend Chinese sovereignty and national pride.¹⁹⁸ Given the international climate China, at its 1982 12th National Congress developed an “independent foreign policy” that invested in international organizations to build cooperative security. China demonstrated this through a greater commitment to UN peacekeeping.¹⁹⁹

Chinese leadership began affirming UN peacekeeping importance while clearly using Westphalian restraints. Liang Yufan, the deputy permanent representative in the UN, reaffirmed that the UN has an important role in maintaining peace and security; however, it must operate using the principles of state sovereignty as advocated by the

¹⁹⁵ James Mann, *About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 95.

¹⁹⁶ Zhang, “China and UN Peacekeeping: From Condemnation to Participation,” 6–7.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁹⁸ Susan Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower, How China’s Internal Politics Could Derail its Peaceful Rise* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 257.

¹⁹⁹ Zhang, “China and UN Peacekeeping: From Condemnation to Participation,” 7.

Westphalians.²⁰⁰ These principles were echoed by the Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang on the anniversary of the founding of the UN.

To demonstrate China's new found cooperation in UN peacekeeping China began approving peacekeeping operations on the Security Council, paying its peacekeeping dues, and sending personnel as observers to peacekeeping operations.²⁰¹ These behavior changes clearly indicate that China was moving towards greater acceptance of UN peacekeeping norms, while still maintaining strong Westphalian beliefs. The UN Security Council brought two new peacekeeping missions to vote during this period and voted in favor of both.²⁰²

Chinese leadership balanced its self-interest and identity as a growing power to maximize its ability to continue to grow economically and internationally as a respected power. The Chinese move from non-intervention to cooperation with UN peacekeeping, though only encompassing a small number of votes on operations, was a clear signal that China was moving closer to accepting global norms. China was moving from the fringes into the center preparing its way for its next major shift in policy. Of the three UN Security Council Votes for a peacekeeping operation during this period China abstained twice and voted in favor once.²⁰³

E. PHASE 4, PARTICIPATION, 1988–PRESENT: IDENTITY

Analysis of this period indicates China's developing identity influenced its foreign policy towards UN peacekeeping from 1988 to the present. China deepened its commitment to global international norms as it transitioned from its cooperation phase, of no longer abstaining in votes and contributing financially to peacekeeping funding, and moved to a phase of participation. The PRC's national interests have expanded beyond its

²⁰⁰ Zhang, "China and UN Peacekeeping: From Condemnation to Participation," 7.

²⁰¹ Yin He, "China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations," *Institute for Security Development Policy* (2007): 20.

²⁰² United Nations, Security Council, accessed 13 February 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/searchvote.asp>.

²⁰³ Ibid.

borders into the international arena.²⁰⁴ This expansion has had a corresponding change in the identity of China and a re-evaluation of the role that it should have in global politics. As Alexander Wendt argues, “what matters is the identities and interests that states bring to their interactions and the subsequent impact of the latter on the former.”²⁰⁵ China’s view of themselves as approaching great power status as a result of its economic growth have pushed China to take its place among the powerful international states.²⁰⁶ The PRC’s growing material wealth is not matched in its soft power; the PRC, “lacks discourse power in defining international values and goods”; however, the influence of the PRC is growing as they demonstrate an alternative model to the liberal western view.²⁰⁷ The United Nations and its peacekeeping arm provide China the opportunity to demonstrate its great power status to other states by providing large financial and increasing quantity of troop contributions, especially when compared to other rich states and members of the Security Council, as well to its own people that China has brought about a resurgence of Chinese power and influence in the world, all the while upholding Westphalian principles.

The PRC as both a developing and a strong nation enables it to straddle the line in peacekeeping operations to be seen and see itself as a state willing and able to help other developing states without the concern of political and economic interests. The PRC is also able to garner host nation support because of its Westphalian stance, which means it will limit international pressure to change the domestic institutions of the host nation. The PRC’s fear of western security agreements has kept it out of joining in many agreements. Some host nations see the lack of security agreements as a positive as it will preclude outside interests from intruding on the peacekeeping operation. The fact that China is not tied to many security organizations ensures that it operates through the UN, unlike the

²⁰⁴ Canrong Jin, “International Structure and China’s Strategy and Options,” in *China in the International System: Becoming a World Power*, ed. Xiaoming Huang and Robert G. Patman (New York: Routledge, 2013), 64.

²⁰⁵ Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” *The American Political Science Review* 88 (1994): 388.

²⁰⁶ Courtney Fung, “What Explains China’s Deployment to UN Peacekeeping Operations,” *International Relations of Asia Pacific* 16 (2015): 411.

²⁰⁷ Jin, “International Structure and China’s Strategy and Options,” 65.

United States which has multiple organizations to work through to be able to take actions, as was demonstrated in its efforts to block Serbian aggression without UN approval. The PRC's lack of organic power projection capabilities along with its poor integration in security agreements limits its ability to build and supply units on foreign duties.²⁰⁸ This lack of power projection alleviates fears within the host nation of sustained aggression on the part of the PRC. In addition, the PRC's former colonial past lends legitimacy when they provide peacekeeping operations to developing nations.²⁰⁹ Developing nations also see the support from the PRC as less divisive as the Western powers often have governance requirements associated with their support, but the PRC does not place such restrictions.²¹⁰ Nations in need of assistance are less reluctant to accept support from the PRC because of its Westphalian principles and strong stance on state sovereignty issues.

The PRC has not listed human rights as significant enough justification to support UN peacekeeping operations. The PRC has often regarded the western promotion of human rights as an attempt at regime change.²¹¹ China has feared western willingness to instituted regime change believing that they may one day be on the receiving end of one of those attempts. China made the declaration at the end of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 that, “the politicization of human rights and the imposition of human rights conditionalities ... constitute a violation of human rights.”²¹² China made it clear through this declaration their opposition to the western imposition of good governance requirements as factors before granting aid.

The Chinese Westphalian policy of commitments to the sovereignty of the state has been reduced recently. The PRC did not view threats to civilians created by their own governments' as justification for the use of force. The PRC has approved peacekeeping forces, but has not approved the use of force by those peacekeepers to stop a belligerent

²⁰⁸ Hirono and Lanteigne, “Introducing China and UN Peacekeeping,” 7.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 10.

²¹⁰ Zhang, “China and UN Peacekeeping: From Condemnation to Participation,” 12.

²¹¹ Taylor, “Global Economy, Development Imperatives, and Mutual Interests: China and Africa,” 186.

²¹² Ibid., 182.

actor from attacking another.²¹³ China approved peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia, but opposed the use of force under Chapter VII to stop further attacks and prevent further loss of life.²¹⁴ The growing international pressure to intervene in Darfur against the Sudanese government put a lot of pressure on China, which had economic and diplomatic ties to the government of Sudan. The PRC used its leverage with Sudan to get the Sudanese to acquiesce to a joint UN and African Union (AU) peacekeeping operation in Darfur. This enabled the PRC to avoid a vote in the UN to mandate a peacekeeping operation. The PRC was able to leverage its diplomacy to avoid a conflict with western powers that were receiving strong pressure to pursue military action against Sudan, a trading partner with China.²¹⁵

China has modified its stance on state sovereignty over time. The principle of the responsibility to protect has “reframed sovereignty as a responsibility, as opposed to a right.”²¹⁶ China initially opposed the principle in its initial planning phases from 2000–2005. China participated in the drafting at the UN World Summit and ensured that the language was modified to ensure narrow the ability of the UN to invoke peacekeeping or enforcement under the UN Charter.²¹⁷ By 2009 China has adopted the first two of the three pillars:

1. States bear primary protection responsibilities.
2. The international community should assist to meet their protection responsibilities.
3. The international community should be prepared to use force via the UNSC, if peaceful means fail.²¹⁸

²¹³ Hirono and Lanteigne, “Introducing China and UN Peacekeeping,” 8.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

²¹⁵ Chin-Hao Huang, “Principles and Praxis of China’s Peacekeeping,” in *China’s Evolving Approach to UN Peacekeeping*, ed. Marc Lanteigne and Miwa Hirono (Routledge: New York, 2012), 24, and Miwa Hirono, “China’s Charm Offensive and Peacekeeping: The Lessons of Cambodia—What Now for South Sudan?,” in *China’s Evolving Approach to UN Peacekeeping*, ed. Marc Lanteigne and Miwa Hirono (New York: Routledge, 2012), 95

²¹⁶ Courtney Fung, “China and the Responsibility to Protect: From Opposition to Advocacy,” *Peace Brief*, no.205 (2016): 1. United States Institute of Peace.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

China has demonstrated its commitment to the “responsibility to protect” principles when it voted to pass and participate in UN mandates for peacekeeping operations to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, and Timor-Leste that specify “the holding of free and fair elections,” as one of the mission’s priorities.²¹⁹ Many critics of the UN discuss how liberal ideology pervades UN mandates for peacekeeping operations. The PRC has overlooked the liberal western influence on these UN mandates. The military personnel assigned by the PRC to support the UN peacekeeping operation are typically force enablers, not infantry, who drill wells and provide health care personnel to improve the conditions for the peacekeepers and the host nation citizens.²²⁰ The PRC’s UN peacekeeping operations have been supportive of human rights and improved the living conditions of the host nations. The PRC maintain its Westphalian principles by stressing the responsibility to protect citizens is primarily on the state and limiting the UN’s peacekeeping to states that request support. Although the PRC often opposes human rights alone, China does improve the humanitarian conditions and human rights of host nations through its peacekeeping deployments under the UN.

The PRC began to recognize that UN peacekeeping missions could enhance their global reputation and act as a restraint on the west as well as a means of enforcing its foreign policy. China has used its ability to veto or provide support to UN peacekeeping operations to garner support for its “One China Policy,” blocking missions to Guatemala in 1997, and Macedonia in 1999.²²¹ China became more nuanced and approved peacekeeping to Haiti in 2004, yet by 2010 when Haiti had not switched recognition from the ROC to the PRC, it withdrew support to the mission.²²² The PRC attempted to use soft power to influence Haiti in a new direction and failed. Rather than reinforcing failure by supporting a regime that did not support them, the PRC pulled out of Haiti while it was still recovering from the devastation of a massive earthquake. In addition, China has

²¹⁹ Suzuki, “Why Does China Participate in Intrusive Peacekeeping? Understanding Paternalistic Chinese Discourses on Development and Intervention,” 32.

²²⁰ Richardson, “A Responsible Power? China and the UN Peacekeeping Regime,” 48.

²²¹ Huang, “Principles and Praxis of China’s Peacekeeping,” 23–24.

²²² *Ibid.*, 24.

seen how other states have used the UN to accomplish its foreign policy objectives. The PRC initially opposed UN operations in Kosovo and witnessed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) act without UN approval.²²³ Russia threatened to veto and the PRC abstained when it came to vote in the Security Council. The Western Powers used the auspices of NATO instead and acted without UN approval. NATO's action was an indication to China that they needed to strengthen the United Nations as a determining body and block other multinational actors from intervening in the domestic affairs of states. China has, since the NATO intervention, sought to enhance the "relevance and authority of the UN," as the premier agency in which to handle international conflict.²²⁴ China has worked to become strong enough both inside and outside the UN to be able to control how peacekeeping operations are committed and to whom.

In addition, China has established itself as one of the premier locations for peacekeeping training. China is capable of hosting international conferences and training to prepare peacekeepers for deployment.²²⁵ Since developing countries are known for committing large numbers of peacekeeping troops, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) augmentation of UN peacekeeping missions in addition to working in developing nations improves the knowledge of the security issues in key regions.²²⁶ China is gaining key knowledge on developing nations through several types of interactions, and they are also building operational knowledge by ensuring that the PLA has members gain experience as key planners and commanders of joint peacekeeping operations.²²⁷ The PRC has been able to develop linkages to many nations through positive interactions via its UN peacekeeping operations.

The PRC's view of the United States as a receding hegemon is largely responsible for the movement toward greater participation in UN peacekeeping missions. Chinese

²²³ Miwa Hirono and Marc Lanteigne, "Introducing China and UN Peacekeeping," in *China's Evolving Approach to UN Peacekeeping*, ed. Marc Lanteigne and Miwa Hirono (Routledge: New York, 2012), 8.

²²⁴ He, "China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations," 50.

²²⁵ Hirono and Lanteigne, "Introducing China and UN Peacekeeping," 4.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 4 and 6.

²²⁷ Richardson, "A Responsible Power? China and the UN Peacekeeping Regime," 48.

international relations analysts have been predicting the collapse of U.S. hegemony and trying to ensure that the PRC is well placed to take advantage of the new multipolar world.²²⁸ The perceived decline in the United States, as shown by the global financial crisis, the rise of the Group of 20 nations (G-20) over the Group of 8 (G-8), which were all western, and the growth of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) block, are all cited as examples by Chinese think tanks.²²⁹ China's perception in a change in the great power politics has encouraged China to now take a much greater role in United Nations peacekeeping operations. China wants others to see it as a "responsible power" contributing to the global good.

Today, China argues that it is one of the strongest advocates for the UN and demonstrates this with financial and personnel contributions, and many see China's support as advancing a liberal agenda. Although debates in China still often discuss the UN peacekeeping support as a potential U.S. or western attempt to contain China.²³⁰ Conversely, this has not stopped China from moving further to embracing the concept of "harmonious world," as touted by President Hu Jintao.²³¹ The policy of protection of sovereignty was recently tested in Sudan as China struggled with the growing lobby of business interests and the business interests' strong ties with a repressive governments and the international consequences of those ties.²³² The conflict in Sudan's Darfur region saw China modify its position on sovereignty and move away from its state centric beliefs that a state has the responsibility to protect its people from abuse and atrocities to a more liberal concept in which the international community has the responsibility to intervene and protect people in event of wide spread acts of violence.²³³ China has

²²⁸ David Shambough, "Chinese Thinking About World Order," in *China in the International System: Becoming a World Power*, ed. Xiaoming Huang and Robert G. Patman (New York: Routledge, 2013), 26.

²²⁹ Ibid., 26.

²³⁰ Ibid., 27.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ian Taylor, "Global Economy, Development Imperatives, and Mutual Interests: China and Africa," in *China in the International System: Becoming a World Power*, ed. Xiaoming Huang and Robert G. Patman (New York: Routledge, 2013), 193.

²³³ Courtney Fung, "China and the Responsibility to Protect," 1–2.

modified its stance but also has clarified by suggesting that regions should build organizations that are capable of detecting and deterring escalating conflicts rapidly and only if necessary, request United Nations peacekeeping assistance.²³⁴ China maintains that the United Nations Security Council must maintain the right to vote for the authorization for the use of force.²³⁵ The China seeks to prevent itself from being drawn into a conflict and seeks to strictly adhere to “the principles of consent of the country concerned, non-use of force except in self-defense, and impartiality.”²³⁶ Nonetheless, China has voted in favor of the last ten peacekeeping missions that had a protection of civilians as a key element.²³⁷ China’s gradual involvement in the UN peacekeeping operations—from opposition, to non-interference, to cooperation, and to participation—has been a slow process influenced by several factors.

Chinese leadership today has reaffirmed its commitments to UN peacekeeping. At a Leaders Summit on UN Peacekeeping in 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced China would maintain a standby force of 8,000 personnel ready for deployment within 60 days for UN peacekeeping operations.²³⁸ In addition, President Xi proclaimed China would “train 2,000 international peacekeepers, give \$100 million in military aid to the African Union, and send its first helicopter squad to peacekeeping operations in Africa.”²³⁹ China’s Minister of National Defense, Chang Wanquan, outlined his countries contributions to UN peacekeeping at the UN Defense Ministerial in 2016. He outlined that of the five permanent Security Council members China provides the most personnel and is the second largest provider of funding.²⁴⁰ He went on to say that China

²³⁴ Courtney Fung, “China and the Responsibility to Protect,” 3.

²³⁵ Sarah Teitt, “The Responsibility to Protect and China’s Peacekeeping Policy,” in *China’s Evolving Approach to UN Peacekeeping*, ed. Marc Lanteigne and Miwa Hirono (Routledge: New York, 2012), 62.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 63.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

²³⁸ Li Wensha and Cecily Liu, “Chinese Peacekeepers Set to Join UN’s Fast-Response Team,” *China Daily*, September 9, 2016.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

had 2,500 personnel participating in nine different missions, and that China had provided over 33,000 personnel.²⁴¹

China has moved from protecting its self-interest to projecting itself in the international community. The commitments made by China go beyond self-interest and show a commitment to global norms on peacekeeping. President Xi has pushed China to expand its commitments to peacekeeping. At the same time China has ensured its Westphalian values are upheld in the Security Council; of its nine vetoes of UN Security Council resolutions on peacekeeping, four have come under President Xi's tenure.

China's voting history in the UN demonstrates that both the UN and China have evolved overtime. Its recent voting record indicates that China is becoming more assertive through the Security Council. Figure 3 demonstrates the Chinese commitment to UN peacekeeping. Figure 3 depicts the number of peacekeeping operations approved per year since the PRC took a seat at the UN Security Council.

²⁴¹ Ibid.




Figure 3. The Number of UN Peacekeeping Operations Approved by the UN per Year and through the Three Phases of Chinese Policy 1971–2016²⁴²

²⁴² Data construed from: United Nations, Security Council, accessed 13 February 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/searchvote.asp>; <http://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990610.SC6686.html>; <http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?profile=voting&index=.VM&term=sres1244>

Figure 4 demonstrates the range of votes on peacekeeping operations from China while sitting on the UN Security Council. The data from Figures 3 and 4 show a significant increase in UN peacekeeping votes after the end of the Cold War and how little China acts as a block to peacekeeping.




Figure 4. Types of Chinese Votes on UN Peacekeeping Operations from 1971 to 2016²⁴³

²⁴³ Data construed from: United Nations, Security Council, accessed 13 February 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/searchvote.asp>; <http://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990610.SC6686.html>; <http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?profile=voting&index=.VM&term=sres1244>.

Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate the Chinese commitment to UN votes and that they have been overwhelmingly supportive of UN peacekeeping operations. Especially when compared to other members of the UN Security Council as shown in Figure 5.




Figure 5. Percentage of Permanent Security Council Members' Veto Votes on Peacekeeping from 1971–2016²⁴⁴

France and China are the only two states below 10% when it comes to vetoing peacekeeping proposals. China's voting pattern and increasing troop and financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations demonstrate its growing commitment to the UN.

²⁴⁴ Data construed from: United Nations, Security Council, accessed 13 February 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/searchvote.asp>.

F. CONCLUSION

Evidence in this chapter indicates that constructivist theories regarding identity and realist security self-interest heavily influenced China's changing policy towards UN peacekeeping operations during different periods. Phase 1 of opposition was dominated by communist identity. The Sino-Soviet split was the result of identity clashes within the international communist movement. China previously viewed UN peacekeeping as a tool by the superpowers to control smaller weaker states. China took the Westphalian approach that any intervention was a threat to state sovereignty. The Westphalian principles were rooted in the Chinese identity as a developing state that has suffered at the hands of stronger powers. The Sino-Soviet split enabled created a security concern that enabled China to a transition into Phase 2. In Phase 2 China became a member of the UN Security Council but softened its stance towards UN peacekeeping operations to that of non-intervention. An even clearer example of change in China's policy towards UN peacekeeping operation occurred in 1981, when China shifted its policy again from non-intervention to cooperation, and began voting to approve peacekeeping operations. The Glasnost between the United States and the Soviet Union once again left China concerned about its security in relation to the two superpowers, which pushed China to seek security in the UN. The shift from cooperation to participation was demonstrated by China seeking to demonstrate that it was a responsible power interested in participating in global institutions that were seen as providing humanitarian support to developing states.

IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

This thesis analyzed the factors that most likely contributed to China's change in policy towards UN peacekeeping operations using Yongjin Zhang's framework of four phases: phase 1 from 1950–1971, condemnation; phase 2 from 1971–1981, non-interference; phase 3 from 1981–1988, cooperation, and phase 4 from 1988–the present, participation. Constructivist theories dominate phase 1 and 4, while realist self-interest theories dominate phases 2 and 3.

The roots of the Westphalian and post-Westphalian arguments can be seen in the international relations theories of Realists and constructionists. Realists see self-interest as the guiding principle of states in foreign policy. While, constructivists view the changing wants and demands of the community as a whole as a key contributor to foreign policy decisions. Neo-realists and constructivists see the following as key justifications for peacekeeping: self-interest which can be security concerns by improving international support against a rival, preventing refugee influxes, or taming civil unrest in similar ethnic communities.²⁴⁵ Financial self-interest can be either through resources gained from the host state, monetary or material benefits such as donations of equipment and UN payments for troop participation.²⁴⁶ These benefits can be used to improve domestic spending to increase their domestic legitimacy.²⁴⁷ The ability to send domestic rivals to a type of unofficial exile to improve domestic security for the regime.²⁴⁸ States undergoing a democratic transition need to demonstrate stability for future international investments and commitments and participation in international organizations can provide the

²⁴⁵ Kathman and Melin, "Who Keeps the Peace? Understanding State Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations," 3, 6; Findlay, "The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping," 7–10.

²⁴⁶ Findlay, "The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping," in *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers, SIPRI Research Report 12*, ed. Trevor Findlay (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 7–10, and Arturo C. Sotomayor, *The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 25–37.

²⁴⁷ Jacob M. Kathman and Molly D. Melin, "Who Keeps the Peace? Understanding State Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations," *International Studies Quarterly* (2016): 3–4.

²⁴⁸ Findlay, "The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping," 7–10.

impression of stability and commitment to norms.²⁴⁹ States participate in peacekeeping to provide experience for the military in operations and in learning to follow constitutional rule.²⁵⁰ In addition, states undergoing a democratic transition seek to align with international organizations to provide elites with socializing opportunities to new norms.²⁵¹ Justifications for humanitarian altruistic issues center on identity. States may identify with people impacted in foreign country.²⁵² The identity of the state indicates that it should respond to a humanitarian crisis.²⁵³ Other states contribute so that they feel that they have done their part to contribute to global norms.²⁵⁴

The UN has amalgamated these concepts into its peacekeeping policy. The UN is influenced by the two poles of Westphalian and post-Westphalian thought. The Cold War influenced the UN and also helped developing states. With the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the two superpower ceased their support to many fragile states. Without additional assistance many governments were no longer able to control their populations and wide spread unrest broke out. Table 3 illustrates the evolution of peacekeeping during key times, the dominant thought driving the peacekeeping, and how the peacekeeping was conducted changed during each period.

²⁴⁹ Sotomayor, *The Myth of the Democratic*, 25–37

²⁵⁰ Findlay, “The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping,” 7–10.

²⁵¹ Sotomayor, *The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper*, 25–37

²⁵² Bass, *Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention*, 19.

²⁵³ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force*, 53.

²⁵⁴ Findlay, “The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping,” 7–10.

Table 3. Evolution of UN Peacekeeping by Era, the Dominant Thought, and Method²⁵⁵

Era	Cold War	Post-Cold War	Post-9/11
Dominant thought in regards to Peacekeeping	Westphalian	Post-Westphalian	Responsibility to Protect
Dominant Method of peacekeeping	Interstate Buffer	Intrastate buffer	Intrastate rebuilding

The UN stepped into the fray, at the urging of the post-Westphalians, with a new mandate to help developing fragile states deal with intrastate conflict. The UN had to modify its practices and techniques to handle this new assignment. The 1990s large scale man-made atrocities, as well as the increased pressure from developing states that were inundated with refugees, pushed many post-Westphalians to call for a transition to a deeper humanitarian commitment. The new mandate put forth called for a responsibility to protect. The principles called for all states to “prevent, react, and rebuild.”²⁵⁶ The Westphalians still oppose many of the principles of the responsibility to protect as they feel it interferes with state sovereignty, but they do support preventative measures and efforts to rebuild.

Yongjin Zhang’s framework of four phases establishes a framework from which to examine the factors that have influenced how Chinese foreign policy has changed. The four phases are: condemnation from 1950 to 1971; non-interference from 1971–1981; cooperation 1981–1989; and participation from 1989 to the present. China has had three significant policy changes during those phases as outlined in Table 4. Table 4 also illustrates the key findings as to what motivates China’s UN peacekeeping policy in each of the phases.

²⁵⁵ Findlay, “The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping,” 7–10.

²⁵⁶ Bellamy, “Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect,” 135.

Table 4. Dominant Policy Factors Influencing Chinese Foreign Policy toward UN Peacekeeping

Phase	1 1950–1971 Opposition	2 1971–1981 Non-interference	3 1981–1988 Cooperation	4 1988–Present Participation
Dominant Factor	Identity	Self-Interest	Self-Interest	Identity

The first change in 1971 was a result of the dominant identity being superseded by self-interest in the late 1960s. The hardline ideology created threats to the PRC from both the Soviet Union and the United States. The security situation deteriorated and China suppressed its hardline communist identity. This brought about a shift in policy from the United States which enabled China to take a seat on the UN Security Council. Now a member of the UN, China switched from opposition to non-interference. China continued to demonstrate its Westphalian principles by abstaining from debating, voting, and paying on any issues relating to peacekeeping.²⁵⁷ China still maintained a caustic rhetoric but did not actively seek to undermine peacekeeping operations, as several peacekeeping operations came up for renewal.

In the 1980s, the détente between the United States and the Soviet Union placed China in an awkward position as both countries began actions that appeared to be isolating China and moving closer together. China was once again feeling its self-interest impaired as a result of a change in its security position, moved to provide greater legitimacy to an international organization that China felt could be used to restrain any potential threat. China changed to a policy of cooperation, paying its dues and no longer abstaining from votes on peacekeeping. China shifted policy to embrace the UN and use it as an ally against any U.S. or Soviet actions.

The next major shift of Chinese policy was a result of an identity shift. The improved security outlook and increased socialization of peacekeeping norms enabled China to view its self as a great power that can provide a new method to success for other

²⁵⁷ Zhang, “China and UN Peacekeeping: From Condemnation to Participation,” 6.

states. China began to emerge as a strong power and was challenged to be a responsible power by other great powers, especially the U.S. China accepted the challenge and began increasing its support to UN peacekeeping and the betterment of developing states. China's identity as both a strong power and a developing state convinced it that it should act to help other developing states, by accepting peacekeeping norms.

International relations scholars debate whether China is a revisionist power seeking to undermine the global standards, or has it accepted the norms. The increasing commitments to UN peacekeeping indicates that China is accepting the norms and to what degree. China has sought out key positions on committees to influence the decision making process, but China has not sought to rollback UN peacekeeping. China has sought to put specific restraints to ensure state sovereignty in keeping with its Westphalian principles. China has participated in UN peacekeeping policy debates and has worked to ensure that it has people in key leadership positions. The growing commitment of combat troops as well as the announcement of an 8,000 fast-response team indicate that China is deepening its commitment.²⁵⁸ The death of peacekeepers in combat demonstrate a resolve elicited from authorities, "In protecting world peace, Chinese soldiers are moving to the forefront, and will increasingly face the test of blood and war. This reflects China's responsibilities as a major power."²⁵⁹

China is seeking to increase the significance of the United Nations as a potential block to United States unilateral power. The increased significance of a respected international institution could act as a block to future U.S. actions. The U.S. would be wise to increase its influence in the UN through greater participation within key committees to ensure that China does not build a consensus against the U.S. as it has reduced its commitment to the organization. This will ensure the U.S. can influence the UN's agenda.

²⁵⁸ Wensha and Liu, "Chinese Peacekeepers Set to Join UN's Fast-Response Team."

²⁵⁹ Jeremy Page and Matina Stevis, "China Discovers the Price of Global Power: Soldiers Returning in Caskets," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 16, 2016, In Depth.

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